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I. INTRODUCTION
The impact of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) on economic,
social, and cultural rights (ESC rights) has been a highly debated issue
by international human rights commentators for almost two decades.'
The late nineties saw the debate transcend academia, as protests of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (collectively,
the IFIs) became common.2 There now exists a whole class of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that concentrates exclusively on
monitoring of the IFIs.3 While much of these protests may oversimplify
the issue, some concern is certainly justified. This Note examines the
possibility that SAPs conflict with ESC rights. Such critiques have be-
come common in the academic literature of the past decade, but usually
share common weaknesses. First, most such critiques of structural ad-
justment are too general in nature to be useful. The more general, the
more hypothetical, and the less likely the possibility of establishing a
viable link between structural adjustment and a violation of economic,
social, and cultural rights. Instead, this Note will examine the substantive
results of SAPs specifically in the context of one country: Argentina.
1. Structural adjustment programs, or conditionality, are conditions attached to a loan
by an international financial institution to a country in lieu of monetary collateral. PAUL
MOSLEY ET AL., AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY-BASED LENDING, ANALYSIS
AND POLICY PROPOSALS 65-66 (1991). For a comprehensive study of structural adjustment,
see generally ERIK DENTERS, LAW AND POLICY OF IMF CONDITIONALITY (1996). Structural
adjustment is a major component of international aid lending. For example, the percentage of
loans involving SAPs was "42 percent in Latin America; 33 percent in sub-Saharan Africa; 30
percent in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa; and 10 percent in Asia." Nancy C. Alex-
ander, Transcending the Vicious Cycle of Debt and Adjustment, in WORLD DEBT AND THE
HUMAN CONDITION: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 171, 173
(Ved P. Nanda et al. eds., 1993).
2. For a detailed, annotated bibliography on the IMF, see 4 ANNE C. M. SALDA, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Robert G. Neville et al. eds., 1992). For a general descrip-
tion of the IMF and evaluations of proposals for changes in the IMF's objectives, see John
Williamson, Reforming the IMF: Different or Better?, in 3 THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: ETHICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 1, 1-7 (Robert J. Myers
ed., 1987).
3. See, e.g., Bretton Woods Project, at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org (last vis-
ited Dec. 16, 2002); GlobalizeThis!, at http://globalizethis.org/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2002); 50
Years is Enough Network, at http://www.50years.org/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2002); Bank In-
formation Center, at http://www.bicusa.org (last visited Dec. 16, 2002); Campagna per la
riforma della Banca Mondiale, at http://www.unimondo.org/guide/fmi (last visited Jan. 24,
2003); Center of Concern, "Rethinking Bretton Woods" Project, at http://www.coc.org/focus/
?ID=902 (last visited Dec. 16, 2002); AITEC, at http://www.globenet.org/ifi (last visited Dec. 16,
2002); Focus on the Global South, at http://www.focusweb.org (last visited Dec. 16, 2002); CEE
Bankwatch Network, at http://www.bankwatch.org (last visited Dec. 16, 2002); Global
Policy Forum, The Three Sisters and Other Institutions, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/
bwi-wto/indexbwi.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2002); World Bunk Group, at http://
www.worldbunk.org (last visited Dec. 16, 2002); Structural Adjustment Participatory Review
International Network, at http://www.saprin.org (last visited Dec. 16, 2002).
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Elaborating specific examples of ways in which Argentine SAPs contra-
dicted Argentina's human rights obligations will facilitate an analysis of
the human rights implications of SAPs that is based on more than mere
speculation.
Another weakness of SAP critiques is that they rarely analyze the
ability of the international human rights mechanisms to address SAPs.
Instead, this Note will build on the Argentine example, developing the
"Structural Adjustment Paradigm," the unique model of human rights
responsibility presented by structural adjustment. Having outlined this
paradigm, the Note will conclude by offering ways in which the existing
(or potential) international human rights mechanisms could (and could
not) address it.
Perhaps as important as what this Note is, is what it is not:
Economic theories abound concerning the causes of the Argentine crisis,4
some of which directly analyze the IMF's causal connection to the
Argentine catastrophe.' A Note on this subject would be one of economic
theory, not international human rights law. While at certain points in the
analysis of the human rights implications of SAPs, it will become
difficult to avoid some speculation of economic theory, it is not the
primary focus of this Note. Rather than implicate the IMF as part of the
cause of the crisis, this Note explicates the ways in which it is an
imperfect solution from the standpoint of ESC rights. It does not attempt
to argue against the prevailing economic theories for the crisis, but rather
discusses ways in which certain provisions of SAPs-provisions also
often present in stronger economic periods-are inconsistent with ESC
rights. To the extent that the ESC rights law discussed in this Note may
appear contrary to the theories embodied in the economic studies cited
above, this may reflect an underlying inconsistency between ESC law
and macroeconomic scholarship, an inconsistency which should be dealt
with in greater detail in future scholarship.
II. SAPs AND ESC RIGHTS: THE BIG PICTURE
This Part examines the effects of SAPs on ESC rights on two levels,
reflecting the difference in thought processes commonly at play between
4. For a detailed summary of many economic analyses of the Argentine crisis, see
MARCOS A. BUSCAGLIA, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF ARGENTINA'S DEBACLE 5, at
http://www.iae.edu.ar/mbuscaglia (Oct. 15, 2002). See also Sebastian Galiani et al., Missed
Expectations: The Argentine Convertibility, at http://www.udesa.edu.ar/deptodeeconomia/
workp/doc55.pdf (Nov. 2002) (offering a highly theoretical explanation of the crisis, but in-
cluding references to many additional studies).
5. See generally MICHAEL MUSSA, ARGENTINA AND THE FUND: FROM TRIUMPH TO
TRAGEDY (2002).
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macroeconomic policy decisions, where the focus is not on the
individual,6 and human rights decisions, where it is.7 The first Section,
reflecting the macroeconomic thought process, attempts to show that
SAPs have, on average, led to worse economic situations. If this can be
shown, then SAPs contradict ESC rights (espoused in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),8 the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),9 the Declaration on the
Right to Development," and the IMF Articles of Agreement themselves."
But, as stated above, a human rights-based critique of SAPs, or of
anything, is less concerned about overall macroeconomic effects and
more concerned with individual effects. The second Section turns toward
this approach, arguing that even if one disregards or disbelieves the first
point and believes that SAPs contribute to a country's overall economic
growth, this does not preclude them from violating the economic, social,
and cultural rights of individual citizens in reaching these
macroeconomic results.
A. The Macroeconomic Standpoint
Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan, and John Toye have investigated the
general effectiveness of SAPs in their extensive two volume work Aid
and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending.2 Although this
6. The Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged defines macroeco-
nomics as the "[s]tudy of the economic system as a whole especially with reference to its
general level of output and income and the interrelations among sectors of the economy-
opposed to microeconomics." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UN-
ABRIDGED 1355 (3d ed. 1986).
7. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 93 (2001) (describing
human rights as "[tihe study of individuals' rights as against their own States of nationality");
SIGRUN SKOGLY, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY FUND 50 (2001) ("The primary rights-subjects in international human
rights law are individuals.").
8. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
art. I(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
9. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/
eng.pdf.
10. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, 41st Sess., 97th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986).
11. IMF Articles of Agreement art. I, § ii, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/
pubs/ft/aa/aa01.htm (defining the purpose of the IMF as contributing "to the promotion and
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and the development of the pro-
ductive resources of all members").
12. MOSLEY ET AL., supra note 1. Because Mosley and coauthors focus on structural
adjustment in the World Bank context, some would object to my generalizing their findings to
the IMF. See SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 17-21 (2001) (outlining some basic features of the IMF
and World Bank and noting that "[t]he programmes run by the IMF differ both in scope and
content from those of the World Bank. The IMF aims at more short term balance of payment
[Vol. 24:577
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study regards the World Bank and not the IMF, the question of structural
adjustment remains essentially the same. The study notes that other
studies, including official World Bank studies on the progress of
Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL) often compare SAL countries with
"other non-oil LDC [Least Developed Countries] as a whole ...
attributing any difference in performance to the impact of SALs.,'
3
Mosley explains that pairing SAL countries with LDCs generally leads
to misleading results since SAL countries may not be representative of
developing countries as a whole. 4
By contrast, the Mosley study creates a set of country pairs, by
matching an SAL country with a comparable non-SAL country in terms
of GNP per capita, GDP growth rates, economic structure, level of
industrialization, prevalence of commercial and subsistence agriculture,
degree of export concentration, and trends in trade." Of course, perfect
pairs were difficult to find: While some countries in the non-SAL control
group had higher GDP growth rates, or more favorable terms of trade in
the pre-SAL period than the SAL-countries to which they were paired,
other control group countries had lower GDP growth rates and less fa-
vorable terms of trade. 6 The same was true for the other economic
factors. By carrying out comparisons between the aggregated data for
each group of countries, the Mosley study accounts for such imperfect
pairings.'7 In this way, the study employs specific pairing instead of the
improvement, which implies an emphasis on contractionary measures, while the Bank aims at
longer term development results which causes them to focus on expansionary measures ....
"); Daniel C. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 53-74 (1996). But see SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 20 ("Towards the end of
the 1970s ... the strict division of labour between the World Bank and the IMF became
blurred. The World Bank moved into more programme lending, and the conditions pertaining
to the loans and credits from both institutions became stricter and more comprehensive than
before. These sets of conditions, combined with the transfer of financial resources, became
more or less institutionalized and have been labeled Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs).... The IMF introduced SAP lending in the early 1980s."). Because the Mosley study
concerns programme lending SAPs of the World Bank after 1980, the results can be general-
ized to IMF SAPs in this Note.
13. MOSLEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 190-92. As the name suggests, an SAL is a loan
with an SAP.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 188-90.
16. Id. at 190.
17. Id. at 190 ("[T]he noticeably imperfect pairings are not systematically imperfect:
some of the non-SAL countries faced more favourable terms of trade than their SAL counter-
part country, others less favourable terms of trade. Hence, in the aggregative statistical
comparisons between the SAL group and the non-SAL group which will be used to assess the
impact of SALs, the effects of the presence of imperfectly paired countries in the non-SAL
control group will, to some extent, cancel out.").
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less useful comparison to LDCs generally,'" but it also makes effective
use of aggregation to balance out specific differences. '9
The study goes on to compare the performance of these country
pairs between 1980 and 1987,0 on the macroeconomic terms that IFIs
understand, and the results are striking:
[F]or both groups of countries annual average GDP growth rates
fell significantly during the latter period. This is hardly surpris-
ing since the period was characterized by the effects of a second
oil price shock, world economic recession, declining commodity
prices, rising interest rates and severe drought in sub-Saharan
Africa. However, given that the programme aid in the form of
SALs was introduced as a response to the effects caused by the
above changes in the international economic environment, one
would expect the decline in GDP growth rates to be less severe
in the case of countries receiving SALs. Surprisingly, . . . aver-
age GDP growth rates for the SAL countries fell from 4.5 per
cent.., to 2.0 per cent .... a decline of 56 per cent. By contrast,
the annual average growth rates for the non-SAL control group
fell from 3.8 per cent ... to 2.7 per cent ... a decline of 28 per
cent. In principle, this problem could be due to bias in the selec-
tion of the sample, and in particular to the possibility that SAL
countries had inherently weaker economies than their non-SAL
counterparts. In fact, the reverse is the case. The control group
had an annual average GDP growth rate of 3.8 per cent in the
pre-SAL period by comparison with 4.5 per cent for the SAL
countries, a gap which reflects the degree of imperfection in the
pairing methodology."
In addition, the study further subdivided the countries by isolating
those SAL countries that actually implemented the majority or all of the
SAL conditions, which it termed "low slippage" countries." Comparing
these countries both to their country pairs or to the general SAL group
yields even more marked results.23 For example, annual GDP growth
rates fell from 3.8 percent to 2.1 percent, compared to the non-SAL low
slippage control group, which increased from 2.3 percent to 3.4 per-
24cent. Mosley concludes that "despite having a stronger growth record in
18. Id. at 190-92.
19. Id. at 190.
20. Id. at 188.
21. Id. at 193-94.
22. Id. at 193.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 193-94.
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the latter half of the 1970s, and despite receiving programme aid, the
SAL group of countries have performed significantly worse than their
non-SAL counterparts.
' 25
In terms of investment, the study yielded similar results. In SAL
countries, investment declined by 17 percent, whereas it only fell 4 per-
cent in the control group.26 Investment as a share of GDP fell for all
countries, but the decline was much more serious in the SAL group.27
Once again, low slippage countries showed an even more marked result:
Investment declined 20 percent in the low slippage countries, but it actu-
ally rose by 11 percent in the group of control countries with which the
low-slippage countries were paired. Thus, as with GDP growth, the
more a country implemented its SAL, the worse its numbers appeared.
Such results provide credible evidence that, on IFIs' own terms,
structural adjustment does not improve growth. Further, Mosley con-
ducted a separate study using regression analysis that attempts to further
isolate the effect of SALs from other variables such as trade movements
and climate changes. 29 This study also found weak growth and negative
investment in the SAL group.3° In summary, although not solely respon-
sible for a country's economic turmoil, this study provides convincing
evidence that structural adjustment contributes to poor economic results,
specifically in the areas of GNP growth and investment, two important
macroeconomic variables for the IMF.3'
B. The Human Standpoint
Although the above results are important in establishing a case
against structural adjustment, human rights are not about
macroeconomic variables: Human rights are about people,32 and nowhere
25. Id. at 194.
26. Id. at 196.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 208-32.
30. Id. at 230.
31. See also Haider Ali Khan, Economic Modeling of Structural Adjustment Programs.
Impact on Human Conditions, in WORLD DEBT AND THE HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 1, at
97, 100 (describing another study of structural adjustment, conducted between 1982 and 1986,
which concludes that "except for current account balance, the comparisons of program versus
nonprogram countries failed to produce any evidence of the effectiveness of IMF conditionali-
ties").
32. See SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 50 ("The primary rights-subjects in international hu-
man rights law are individuals."); BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 93 (describing human rights as
"[t]he study of individuals' rights as against their own States of nationality"); Eugene
Kamenka, Human Rights, Peoples'Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 127 (James Crawford
ed., 1988) ("All rights ... are claims made, conceded or granted by people.... They are as-
serted by people on their own behalf or as perceived and endorsed implications of specific
historical traditions, institutions and arrangements or of a historically conditioned theory of
Winter 2003]
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could this be more true than in the human right to development.33 The
case against SAPs is even more compelling when the SAP is also a
failure in macroeconomic terms as shown above. Regardless of the
relative macroeconomic success of a SAP country, a SAP cannot
demand policy changes that violate an individual's (or a group of
individuals') human rights. This Section outlines the general doctrine
relating to how SAPs violate human rights regardless of their
effectiveness or ineffectiveness at the macroeconomic level. The next
Part then delves into the Argentine context, analyzing how SAPs can
violate specific provisions of the ICESCR.
A discussion of the human rights implications of structural
adjustment should begin with article I of the ICESCR. 4 Section 1 of that
article states, "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they ... freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."" Section 2 continues: "All peoples may, for their own
ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-
operation."36 This idea is embodied in an ongoing debate on the existence
of a "right to development," first articulated by Senegalese jurist Keba
M'Baye in 1972,"7 codified in 1986 in the Declaration on the Right to
human needs .... "); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 Am. U.L. REV. 1 (1982); UDHR, supra note 9, arts. 1-29
(consistently focusing on individual rights, not macroeconomic indicators).
33. See Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 10, pmbl. (declaring that
"the human person is the central subject of the development process and that development
policy should therefore make the human being the main participant and beneficiary of devel-
opment"); Id. art. 2(1) ("The human person is the central subject of development and should
be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development."); James C.N. Paul, The
United Nations and the Creation of an International Law of Development, 36 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 307, 312 (1995) (arguing that the international law of development stresses "that devel-
opment should be people-centered, sustainable, and primarily concerned with the welfare of
the poor and powerless, and that the processes of development should be 'democratized' and
sensitized to 'human rights' ").
34. See ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5. The ICESCR, although not
binding international law for all countries, has been ratified by a large number of States with
145 current State Parties. Furthermore, it has been ratified by almost every State that borrows
from the IMF, with a few exceptions. It is against this background that this Note addresses the
ICESCR and statements by the ESCR Committee, as generally relevant in international juris-
prudence. See UNHCHR, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights
Treaties as of 8 February 2002 [hereinafter Treaty Ratification Status], http://www.unhchr.ch/
pdf/report.pdf.
35. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 1(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
36. Id. art. 1(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
37. Ved P. Nanda, The Right to Development: An Appraisal, in WORLD DEBT AND THE
HUMAN CONDITION, supra note I, at 41,43 (citing Keba M'Baye, Le droit au Developpement
Comme Un Droit de l'Homme, 5 REVUE DES DROITs DE UHOMME 505 (1972)).
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Development.3 8 The international community is divided on whether such
a right exists; on the one hand, Mohammed Bedjaoui, former judge on
the International Court of Justice (President of the Chamber), calls the
right to development "the alpha and omega of human rights, the first and
last human right, the beginning and the end, the means and the goal of
human rights, in short the core right from which all the others stem."'3 9
On the other end of the spectrum, professor of political science Jack
Donnelly argues that such a right to development is without interest in
light of the already firmly established right of self-determination. 40 The
phrasing of the ICESCR article 1(1) seems to lend itself to an
interpretation somewhere in between, where the right of development is
a unique right, ancillary to the right of self-determination but important
enough that it is separately enumerated as a goal of self-determination.4'
Since the adoption of the Declaration on the Right to Development, it
has become increasingly common to embody development norms in
international legal instruments.42 The Secretary General of the United
Nations noted in 1994, "It is particularly through the development and
implementation of legal instruments that the world community of nations
attempts to provide for the basic conditions for social progress.4 3 In fact,
38. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 10, art. I (declaring that
"[t]he right to development is an inalienable human right:' but not defining the right to devel-
opment). The Declaration on the Right to Development received only one dissenting vote,
from the United States. All eight abstentions also came from developed nations. The Declara-
tion received 146 votes in favor. Nanda, supra note 37, at 44. Nanda's article provides a
detailed account of the history of the right to development, challenges facing the right to de-
velopment, and its evolution as an international legal norm.
39. Mohammed Bejaoui, The Right to Development, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 1182 (1991).
40. Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the
Right to Development, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 473, 482 (1985). Furthermore, Donnelly has
been highly critical of all such group rights, including self-determination. For a description of
the philosophical challenges in defining the right to development, the right of self-
determination, and Donnelly's critiques thereof, see Nanda, supra note 37, at 47-48.
41. For yet a third view, see Juan Carlos Hitter, El Derecho al Desarrollo y las Na-
ciones Unidas, [1989-II] J.A. 887. Hitter agrees with the view that the right to development is
fundamental for the elaboration of first and second generation rights, but points out that those
rights are also fundamental to the right to development. Thus, rather than focus on positioning
rights in a hierarchy, the most important characteristic is the indivisible and interdependent
characteristic of all rights. But see id. at 888 (arguing that the right to development is the syn-
thesis of all human rights and most advanced right thus far).
42. Paul, supra note 33, at 307; see also SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 141-43 (describing
the work of three successive U.N. working groups on the right to development established
since 1986).
43. UNITED NATIONS PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT, ANALYSIS OF THE CORE ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE SUMMIT AND POL-
ICY MEASURES TO ATTAIN ITS OBJECTIVES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 47/92; WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: AN OVERVIEW REPORT OF
Winter 2003]
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the Secretary General has created a list of eighty-one international
instruments codifying a commitment to social development." In his
article summarizing the rapidly growing law on the right to development,
professor James C.N. Paul has also argued that, because the two
objectives of development and human rights are stated together in key
articles of the U.N. Charter, "they impose complementary, not separate,
duties. The promotion of economic, social and cultural development
must be harmonized with, indeed reinforced by, the promotion of
universal rights. 45
ICESCR article 1(2) could be read to codify a "right to
development" by placing the effect of "international economic
cooperation" at odds with the right of a people to dispose of their natural
wealth and resources, without mentioning self-determination.46
Regardless of the relative levels of success they achieve, SAPs violate
article 1(2) by forcing a country to accept a set of economic
conditionalities. 47 The notion of free consent over economic choices is
reiterated in ICESCR article 1(1), which states, in relevant part, "The
States Parties . . . will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of
[the right to an adequate standard of living], recognizing to this effect the
essential importance of international co-operation based on free
consent."48 The paradox of structural adjustment is that, by the time the
IMF proposes a SAP, the situation is so grave that outside assistance is
the only way to begin creating a list of economic policy options; yet,
with the outside support, free consent is lost. Because the country
absolutely needs the money, and because the IMF (or perhaps the World
Bank, which also imposes conditionality) is probably the only institution
with enough money to give (or to coordinate sufficient giving), the IMF
has extremely high bargaining power. Because of this role as lender of
last resort (LLR), countries default on private loans in order to pay it
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, T 172, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.166/PC/6 (1994), cited in Paul, supra
note 33, at 307 [hereinafter WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW REPORT].
44. PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT,
OUTCOME OF THE WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: DRAFT DECLARATION AND
DRAFT PROGRAMME OF ACTION, REVIEW OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS RELE-
VANT TO POVERTY, EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION, 2d Sess., Provisional Agenda
Item 4 1 259, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 166/PC/I 6 [hereinafter WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL DEVEL-
OPMENT DRAFT PROGRAMME]; see also Paul, supra note 33, at 307 (noting that "[t]his
contribution is an illustrative, but hardly complete, effort to identify some of the sources and
principles of the international law of development ... that has been generated by the U.N.
system, particularly during the past two decades").
45. Paul, supra note 33, at 312 (quoting U.N. CHARTER arts. 61-62).
46. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 1(2), 993 U.N.TS. at 5.
47. See, e.g., infra Section III.C (economic conditionalities discussed in the Argentine
case). Cf. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 1(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
48. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. I 1(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 7 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 24:577
Winter 2003] The Argentine Case Revisited 587
back. 9 In this regard, the World Bank and IMF probably have the lowest
default rating of any bank in history, as no country wants to lose the
chance of future bailouts0 nor tarnish their image with those who set the
pace for all other development banks worldwide, as the IMF recently
pointed out in the Argentine context." So, the State Party is confronted
with a unique human rights paradigm, the "Structural Adjustment
Paradigm" (elaborated in Part IV below), by which the State Party, with
low bargaining power, has to accept the terms offered by the IMF,
regardless of their consistency with ESC rights, because they have no
other source of equivalent funds. Recognizing the necessary evil of
outside assistance, the ICESCR includes article 22, which states that the
Economic and Social Council will advise technical assistance agencies
on matters which will help them make decisions consistent with the
Covenant. 2 In expanding on this article, the Committee on Economic,
49. Argentina's Collapse: Progress, of Sorts, ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 2002, at 34. (noting
that Argentina defaulted on loans from private creditors in December 2001, but continues to
service its debts to IFIs); Lance Taylor, IMF Conditionality: Incomplete Theory, Policy Mal-
practice, in 3 THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 33
(Robert J. Myers ed., 1987) ("[T]he IMF is the final source of cash-the lender of last re-
sort'"); MICHEL AGLIETTA & SANDRA MOATTI, LE FMI: DE L'ORDRE MONtTAIRE Aux
D9SORDRES FINANCIERS 178-89 (2000) (describing the IMF as a "nouveau module
d'institution financi~re, chargd d'une veritable fonction de preteur en dernier resort interna-
tional [new model of financial institution, whose role is to function as a true lender of last
resort]").
50. Under IMF statutes, a debtor in arrears more than twelve months can be suspended
from membership in the organization. Id. One glaring exception to this rule was the Argentina
default on US$805 million dollars due to the World Bank in October 2002. La Arkentina
Seguird sin Pagarle al Banco Mundial, LA NACION, Dec. 13, 2002, available at
http://www.lanacion.com.ar; see also La Argentina No Pagard Mds Hasta No Acordar con el
FMI, LA NACION, Nov. 22, 2002, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar; El FMI Insiste en
que Se Le Pague al Banco Mundial, LA NACION, Nov. 21, 2002, available at
http://www.lanacion.com.ar; Para Acordar el FMI Pide que Se Le Pague al Banco Mundial,
LA NACION, Nov. 20, 2002, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar.
51. See Anoop Singh (IMF), Introductory Remarks on the Role of the IMF Mission in
Argentina, Press Briefing, Buenos Aires, Apr. 10, 2002, available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/tr/2002/tr020410.htm (noting that "an agreement with the Fund is key to unlock
the wider international support that will be needed for ... [an overall economic stabilization]
program"); see also Mussa, supra note 5, at 57 (noting that the IMF and other suppliers of
official support "will surely and rightfully insist that their claims be fully serviced, and this
potentially diminishes the resources available to meet the claims of Argentina's private credi-
tors").
52. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 22, 993 U.N.T.S. at 10. Of course, this does not solve
the self-determination/right to development problem, but in the very least ECOSOC can
provide a counterbalance to the macroeconomic factors IFIs are likely to consider first. In
addition, three successive decisions of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights call for added
input from governments, NGOs, and other international organizations. See U.N. OHCHR, Effects
of Structural Adjustment Policies on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, Comm'n on Hum.
Rts. Decision 1997/103, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/DEC/1997/103 (1997); U.N. OHCHR, Effects of
Structural Adjustment Policies on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, Comm'n on Hum. Rts.
Decision 1998/102, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/DEC/1998/102 (1998); U.N. OHCHR, Effects of
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Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) said in a General
Comment:
A matter which has been of particular concern to the Committee
in the examination of the reports of States parties is the adverse
impact of ... adjustment measures on the enjoyment of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights in many countries. The
Committee recognizes that adjustment programmes will often be
unavoidable and that these will frequently involve a major ele-
ment of austerity. Under such circumstances, however,
endeavors to protect the most basic economic, social and cultural
rights become more, rather than less, urgent. 3
Thus, recognizing the unavoidable evil of outside assistance (and ac-
companying austerity measures), the Committee perceptively insists that
it is just such situations when ESC rights are most at risk. The idea that
ESC rights are any less important in difficult economic times requiring
austerity measures is similar to the argument in the civil and political
rights context that emergency due to terrorism might merit the sacrifice
of civil liberties. In both cases, human rights commentators argue that it
is during such emergencies that human rights are most important.54 The
next Part illustrates (in the Argentine context) the tension between SAPs
and ESC rights identified by the Committee.
0
Structural Adjustment Policies on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, Comm'n on Hum. Rts.
Decision 1999/104, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/DEC/1999/104 (1999).
53. U.N. ESCOR, 4th Sess., General Comment No. 2, International Technical Assis-
tance Measures art. 22 (1990), in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 17 9, U.N. Doc.
HRI\GEN\l\Rev.5 (2001).
54. Compare id. (stating that in times of economic austerity, "endeavors to protect the
most basic economic, social and cultural rights become more, rather than less, urgent"), with
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, Address to Amnesty Interna-
tional USA Annual General Meeting (Apr. 19, 2002), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
usacrisis ("International human rights standards are at real risk of being undermined in the
wake of the I I th of September. . . . The way to combat terrorism is to do so by upholding
vigorously international human rights and humanitarian law standards."); see also WORLD
SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW REPORT, supra note 43, T 126 ("During peri-
ods of economic stress, it is even more important to consider how social protection can be
enhanced."); Emanuele Baldacci et al., Financial Crises, Poverty, and Income Distribution,
FIN. & DEV., June 2002, at 24, 27 (three economists at the IMF stress the importance of ade-
quate social safety nets in time of economic crisis).
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III. SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATIONS OF ESC RIGHTS BY SAPS:
THE ARGENTINE CASE REVISITED
A joke on the streets of Buenos Aires: Tu sabes por qug a
Menem [ex-president of Argentina] le decian "perro rabioso"?
Porque estaba amarrado alfondo5
"What has happened in Argentina is global terrorism of interna-
tional organizations.
'5 6
A. Introduction
Argentina provides a particularly interesting case study in the greater
question of the human rights obligations of IFIs: In the 1930s, income
per head in Argentina was similar to France, Germany, and Canada,"7 and
Argentina helped feed a ravaged post-war Europe. 8 Such bygones have
long faded for the people on the streets of Buenos Aires, as one of the
largest economies in the world has been swallowed up by enormous
debt, recurring financial crisis, and control by IMF SAPs. It was no sur-
prise that Margaret Conklin and Daphne Davidson used Argentina as a
case study in their comprehensive 1986 article "The IMF and Economic
and Social Human Rights: A Case Study of Argentina, 1958-1985.
59
Much has happened economically in Argentina since 1985, all
closely related to economic, social, and cultural rights. The headlines
55. The joke was provided by a Peruvian law student at the Catholic University of
Lima, Peru. The double meaning is: (1) "You know why they call Menem a rabid dog? Be-
cause he was tied to the Fund"; and (2) "You know why they call Menem a rabid dog?
Because he was tied up in back."
56. Declaration by Uruguayan author and political activist Edwardo Galeano, recently
announced on Argentine national television ("Lo ocurrido en Argentina es el terrorismo global
de los 6rganos intemacionales"), reported at Argentina: Del Suefio Democrdtico a la Pesadilla
Neoliberal, at http://www.nnc.cubaweb.cu/mesas/mesal2312-01.htm (last visited Dec. 16,
2002).
57. Argentina's Economy: Down, and Almost Out, in Buenos Aires, ECONOMIST, Nov. 3,
2001, at 43.
58. Tom Vogel, Worst May Yet Come in Argentina's Crisis, BLOOMBERG NEWS (S5o
Paulo), Jan. 3, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Economic News.
59. Margaret Conklin & Daphne Davidson, The IMF and Economic and Social Human
Rights: A Case Study of Argentina, 1958-1985, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 227 (1986). For additional
accounts covering roughly this same period, see LUIGI MANZETTI, THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND AND ECONOMIC STABILIZATION: THE ARGENTINE CASE (1991) (analyzing
the stabilization plans of the Frondizi, Videla, and Alfonsin administrations); KENDALL W.
STILES, NEGOTIATING DEBT: THE IMF LENDING PROCESS 169-95 (1991) (analyzing IMF
lending in Argentina between 1982-87); Jorge Marshall S. et al., IMF Conditionality: The
Experiences of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, in IMF CONDITIONALITY 275 (John Williamson
ed., 1983) (analyzing IMF conditionality in Argentina between 1958 and 1977).
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Argentina made in the eighties due to massive hyperinflation 6° are now
overshadowed by the events of 2000-2002. And what peculiar events
they are: When Argentine President Menem was given the honor of ap-
pearing with U.S. President Clinton to address the joint IMF/World Bank
meeting in 1998, Argentina was the IMF's poster child.6' Two years later,
Argentina was the scene of the largest sovereign default in human his-
tory.62 The country's debt has topped US$132 billion dollars, over half of
its GDP. This is gargantuan compared to its neighbor Chile who, with
half the population has a public debt of only US$5 billion.63 In one day
in November 2001, over US$1.3 billion fled Argentine banks.6 Unem-
ployment in the country rose to 25 percent in 2002.65 Industrial output
dropped 15 percent 66 and prices of a "basic basket" of groceries rose by
50 percent in a year.67 Forty-seven percent of the population now lives in
poverty.
68
The situation has gotten so bad that 100 people reportedly volun-
teered to be crucified in protest to the economy's troubles in the northern
province of Jujuy.69 Banging pots in protest in the streets has become a
national pastime, but as yet such demonstrations have only led to more
negative results, with thirty-one dead, thousands injured, and about two
thousand arrested.70 Politicians in government have fared little better than
60. Timeline: Argentina-A Chronology of Key Events, BBC NEWS ONLINE, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/low/english/world/americas/newsid_1196000/1196005.stm (last visited
Dec. 17, 2002) (noting that in 1983, inflation was higher than 900 percent).
61. MussA, supra note 5, at 19.
62. Id. at 71.
63. Anthony DePalma, Fixing Argentina: Whose Job Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2002,
§ 4, at 4. There are, of course, other countries in the world with a similar debt burden. In fact,
most industrialized countries have government debt-to-GDP ratios of at least 50 percent and
some over 100 percent. Michael Mussa, former Director of the Department of Research at the
IMF, explains why such a debt-to-GDP ratio can be sustained in industrialized countries but is
alarming in developing countries generally and Argentina in particular. Mussa identifies five
factors that make the Argentine debt-to-GDP ratio of around 50 percent so dangerous: 1) Low
tax revenues available for debt servicing; 2) Large amount of debt held in foreign currencies;
3) A highly volatile debt-to-GDP ratio even in periods of good economic circumstances; 4)
Particular vulnerability to external shocks; and 5) A history of periodic financial crises and
debt restructuring. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 16-17.
64. Argentina's Economy: Strapped for Cash, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2001, at 36.
65. Argentina's Crisis: Floating into the Unknown, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2002, at 31, 32.
66. Argentina's Crisis: Waiting for the IMF to Tango, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 2002, at 31,
31.
67. Id.
68. Daniel Merolla, IMF Team Sets Conditions for Helping Argentina Beat Recession,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 11, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Economic News.
69. Argentina Survival Struggle, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2002, 31, 31.
70. Carlos Gabetta, Argentina: IMF Show State Revolts, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE,
Jan. 2002, available at http://mondediplo.com/2002/01/12argentina; see also Argentina: Del
Sueho Democrdtico a la Pesadilla Neoliberal, supra note 56, at http://www.nnc.cubaweb.cu/
mesas/mesa12312-01 .htm.
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their constituents on the streets, the country going through an incredible
five presidents in two weeks time.' According to a recent opinion poll,
half the country favors cutting all ties with the IMF.
72
Amidst all of this, the IMF has publicly denied all responsibility for
the Argentine crisis.73 Now more than ever, Argentina provides an impor-
tant case study on the effect of SAPs on economic, social, and cultural
rights.74 As the economic woes of Argentineans continue to make daily
headlines, this Note cannot claim to be a final chapter in the story of
ESC rights in Argentina, but in light of the most recent (indeed, current)
financial hardships facing Argentina, and the appointment of a Working
Group on Structural Adjustment in 1996,"5 an Independent Expert on
Structural Adjustment in 1997,76 and a Special Rapporteur on Structural
Adjustment in 2000,77 the time is ripe to revisit the relationship of ESC
rights to SAPs in the Argentine context.
B. Human Rights Law in the Argentine Legal Order
Before beginning an analysis of international Human Rights in rela-
tion to Argentina, it is appropriate to outline the position of human rights
law in the Argentine legal order. This Section will trace the growing ac-
ceptance of international human rights law in Argentina.
Miguel A. Ciuro Caldani notes that the recognition of international
law within domestic Argentine jurisprudence has been evolving since
1899, when Heinrich Triepel first noted the distinction between monism
and dualism." Article 31 of the Argentine Constitution is decidedly
71. Argentina's Crisis: Floating into the Unknown, supra note 65, at 31.
72. La Gente No Objeta Una Renegociacirn Favorable, LA NACION, Nov. 17, 2002,
available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar.
73. Jornadas del 19 y 20 de diciembre en Argentina: El FMI Rechaza Responsabilida-
des en la Crisis Argentina, DIARIO EL PAls (Espaiia), Dec. 21, 2001, at 5; see also MUSSA,
supra note 5, at 68-69 (admitting that the IMF failed Argentina, but arguing that that failure
was in not pressing even harder for fiscal austerity).
74. Michael Mussa notes that an examination of the Argentine crisis is also particularly
enlightening because 1) the IMF was deeply involved with Argentina for many years before
the crisis, unlike other countries which have received exceptionally large bail-out packages,
and 2) the economic issues concerned in the Argentine crisis (as compared to the Russian
crisis) fell squarely into the IMF's areas of expertise, being fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate
policy. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 2-3.
75. See Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities on Its Forty-Seventh Session, U.N. OHCHR, 47th Sess., at 13-14, 5, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1996/2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/51 (Oct. 23, 1995).
76. U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Item 5, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/26 (1998).
77. According to the UNHCHR, the Special Rapporteur on Structural Adjustment was
appointed through ESCOR Resolution 2000/82 and Decision 2000/109, but these documents
are not yet available. See http://www.unhchr.chlhtml/menu2/7/b/tm.htm.
78. Miguel A. Ciuro Caldani, Los Acuerdos Internacionales en la Reforma de la
Constitucion Nacional, [1995-I] J.A. 816. The distinction between monism and dualism is
now well-established in international law. Professor Bederman has summarized this
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monist, stating that the supreme law of the land shall come from three
sources: the Constitution, national laws, and international treaties.7 9
Caldani explains that, within this monism, Argentine jurisprudence has
passed through several stages of development throughout the years. First,
the Supreme Court of Argentina upheld the primacy of the Constitution
over treaties, although controversy abounded in cases where laws and
treaty provisions were in conflict. Eventually, the treaties were given
equal force as laws, but it was generally accepted that subsequently
enacted laws could trump treaties. Throughout the latter half of the
twentieth century, the power of treaties was increasingly recognized in
Argentina, with the Supreme Court finding guidance in article 27 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, which states, "A
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for
its failure to perform a treaty."' This was generally accepted until the
radical changes brought about by the Constitutional Convention of
1994:8' Choosing to let article 31 stand, the framers of the 1994
amendments instead worked within article 75 (formerly article 67) of the
Argentine Constitution. The language they adopted is a bold
commitment to incorporate international human rights standards into the
Argentine domestic legal order:
The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man; the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights; The International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights; The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights... [among others including all six of the ma-
jor human rights treaties] have constitutional status, do not
derogate from any article in the first part of this constitution, and
should be understood to complement the rights and guarantees
recognized in it. They can only be denounced through the power
of the National Executive subject to the approval of two thirds of
the members of both houses in the legislature. Future human
rights treaties, once approved by Congress, require a vote of two
well-established in international law. Professor Bederman has summarized this distinction in
the following terms: "[Mionism is the idea that international law and domestic law are parts of
the same legal system, but that international law is higher in prescriptive value that [sic]
national law. Dualism is the position that international law and municipal law are separate and
distinct legal systems which operate on different levels, and that international law can only be
enforced in national law if it is incorporated or transformed." BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at
151-52.
79. Caldani, supra note 78, at 816.
80. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 339 (effect on Argentine jurisprudence analyzed by Caldani, supra note 78, at 816 n.4).
81. Caldani, supra note 78, at 816.
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thirds of the members of both houses to reach this same level of
82
constitutional status.
Beyond simply recognizing these human rights treaties, even beyond
putting treaty obligations on the same level as statutory law, the Argen-
tine Constitution actually elevates these human rights treaties to the level
of constitutional law.83 This is done not only expressly (by naming the
relevant treaties and saying they will enjoy constitutional status) but also
by example (explaining both the constitutional amendment process it
would take to undo the constitutionalization of these human rights in-
struments, as well as the stringent amendment process required to
constitutionalize additional treaties).8 In this way, the constitutionaliza-
tion of these human rights treaties is made absolutely certain. In 1996,
Argentina's Supreme Court explained the reasoning of the framers of
this provision, justifying and legitimizing their actions:
In section 22 of Article 75 of the national constitution, which
gives constitutional status to international treaties, the Framers
have made a value judgment, in which they have examined the
treaties and the constitutional articles and verified that not the
slightest derogation in meaning is produced, a judgment that the
constituted powers will be neither changed nor contradicted."
82. CoNsT. ARG. art. 75, sec. 22, reported in Caldani, supra note 78, at 817-18. The
Spanish text as it appears in Caldani reads:
La Declaraci6n Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre; la Declaraci6n
Universal de Derechos Humanos; la Convenci6n Americana sobre Derechos
Humanos; el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Econ6micos, Sociales y Culturales;
el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Polfticos y su Protocolo Facultativo
... [y otros incluyendo todo los seis tratados de derechos humanos mas conocidos]
tienen jerarqufa constitucional, no derogan artfculo alguno de la primera parte de
esta Constituci6n y deben entenderse complementarios de los derechos y garantias
por ella reconocidos. Solo podrin ser denunciados, en su caso, por el Poder
Ejecutivo nacional, previa aprobaci6n de las dos terceras partes de la totalidad de
los miembros de cada Cmara. Los demis tratados y convenciones sobre derechos
humanos, luego de ser aprobados por el Congreso, requerirgn del voto de las dos
terceras partes de la totalidad de los miembros de cada Cdmara para gozar de la
jerarqufa constitucional.
Id. English translation is the author's own, and the original Spanish text should be taken as
authoritative.
83. Caldani, supra note 78, at 818.
84. See ARG. CONST. art. 75, sec. 22, reported in Caldani, supra note 78, at 817-18.
85. Chocobar v. Caja Nacional de Previsi6n para el Personal del Estado y Servicios
Ptiblicos, Semanario n. 6033 del 16/4/97 (Dec. 27, 1996), reported in Jose Luis Amadeo, Los
Tratados Internacionales con Jerarquia Constitucional (Interpretados por la Corte Suprema),
[ 1997-1I] J.A. 1113.
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Thus, not only does the Court recognize the constitutionalization of
the human rights instruments listed in article 75, but it also validates and
supports it. It gives full legitimacy to the framers of this amendment,
eliminating any doubt as to the consistency between the Argentine
Constitution and the human rights instruments it has incorporated.86 The
court reaffirmed its words verbatim in 1998 in Petric v. Diario Pdgina
12.87 Furthermore, it stated in another case that "constitutional clauses
and those with constitutional status have the same status, are
complementary, and above all cannot displace or contradict each other.""s
It has, therefore, been recognized by the framers of the constitutional
amendment, and by the Supreme Court, that certain human rights treaties
carry constitutional status in Argentina. It is against this legal backdrop
that this Note will examine the respect for economic, social, and cultural
rights in Argentine structural adjustment programs.
C. International Adhesion Contracts: Argentina's
Letters of Intent to the IMF
At the time this Note was written, the current official understanding
between the government of Argentina and the IMF as to conditionality
for continued IMF assistance was set out in Argentina's August 30, 2001
Letter of Intent to the IMF and attached Memorandum of Economic
Policies (hereinafter LOI/MOU). 9 Subsequent to this date, changes have
been made to the amount of Argentina's standby credit,9 some debt has
been postponed on an emergency basis,9' some funds from a prior pack-
[En el art. 75 inc. 22 CN., que otorg6 jerarqufa constitucional a tratados interna-
cionales, los constituyentes han efectuado un juicio de comprobaci6n en virtud del
cual han cotejado los tratados y los artfculos constitucionales y han verificado que
no se produce derogaci6n alguna, juicio que no pueden los poderes constituidos
desconocer o contradecir.]
English translation by the author. Spanish should be taken as authoritative.
86. Id.
87. Petrie v. Diario Pigina 12, [1998-IV] J.A. 316 (Apr. 16, 1998).
88. Monges v. Universidad de Buenos Aires, CSJN [1998-1] J.A. 350, 353 (Dec. 26,
1996), cited in Amadeo, supra note 85, at 1113. ["Las clfusulas constitucionales y las de jer-
arqufa constitucional, tienen la misma jerarquia, son complementarias y, por lo tanto, no
pueden desplazarse o destruirse recfprocamente."]
89. Govt. of Arg., Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic Policies, Technical
Memorandum of Understanding to Horst Kohler, Managing Director, IMF, Aug. 30, 2001
[hereinafter LOI/MOU], available at http://www.imf.org/Extemal/NPILOI/200I/arg/02/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
90. See, e.g., Press Release No. 01/37, IMF Augments Argentina Stand-By Credit
to $21.57 Billion, and Completes Fourth Review, (Sept. 7, 2001), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/200 I/pr0137.htm.
91. The Events That Triggered Argentina's Crisis, BBC NEWS ONLINE (Dec. 21, 2001 ), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_ 1721000/1721103.stm. (noting that on Dec. 18,
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age were withheld,92 and Argentina spent all of 2001 in frenzied negotia-
tions with the IMF before finally concluding a new agreement for
US$6.78 billion on January 24, 2003. 9' All of these events carry their
own set of demands by the IMF, and it can be complicated to determine
what is official policy. In this Section, the LOI/MOU will be analyzed on
a general level from a human rights perspective, before addressing spe-
cific provisions in the following Subsections.
The gracefully worded sixteen page document advocates further in-
creases in IMF loans, nonchalantly requesting 800 percent of the quota
set for Argentina under the IMF Standby Agreement with the IMF. 94 Yet,
at the same time it attempts to paint a positive economic picture of the
country: In the midst of Argentina's economic disaster, the letter claims
"substantial progress,"9 citing the attached Memorandum, without speci-
fying how it supports this point. It predicts "the attainment of fiscal
balance and a sustainable public debt position much earlier than antici-
pated in our original program" if its provisions are met, without96
justifying why the measures are likely to succeed. The economic pan-
demonium making headlines around the world97 is largely reduced to
dependent clauses, such as "Despite a difficult environment .. .98 and
"Despite the weak Economy .... 9
In the entire document, military spending (US$3.1 billion in 2000'")
is never mentioned, whereas cuts in social security are discussed five
times."n The document describes an entire "understanding of economic
policies" without ever referring to the citizens of Argentina. The words
"people," "person," "citizen," "laborer," "lower-class," "poor," "women,"
2001 the IMF allowed Argentina to postpone its January interest payment of US$940 million
in light of the crisis).
92. Id. (noting the IMF's December 5 announcement not to disperse US$1.3 billion in
aid because austerity measures were not tough enough).
93. See Finalmente, Ayer se Firm6 el Acuerdo con el FMI, LA NACION, Jan. 25, 2003,
available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar; see also Tras Acordar con el FMI, el Pais Refinancia
US$11,000 Millones, LA NACION, Jan. 17, 2003, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar
(describing the year of negotiations as "arduous"); Kohler: El FMI Corre Riesgos al Acordar
con la Argentina, LA NACION, Jan. 18, 2003, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar (Econ-
omy Minister Roberto Lavagna characterizing the year's negotiations as "long and hard").
94. LOI/MOU, supra note 89, Letter 2.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Austerity Plan in Argentina Provokes Wide Protests, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 1, 2001, at A3.
98. LOIIMOU, supra note 89, Memorandum 1.
99. Id. $ 2.
100. Christopher Hellman, Last of the Big Time Spenders: U.S. Military Budget Still the
World's Largest, and Growing, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION (Feb. 4, 2002), available
at http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme/spendersFY03.html.
101. LOI/MOU, supra note 89, Memorandum 9 3, 9, 12, 20, and Technical Memorandum
7 ("Structural Background").
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"children," "standard of living," "cost of living," and "earning power" are
completely absent from the seven thousand word document. 0 2 The use of
the word "wage" is restricted to five references to cutting wages,'0 3 two
references to paying provincial government workers with patacones'°4
("provincial bonds" that are not, in fact, real money at all0 5), and one
reference to increasing the minimum wage necessary to qualify for so-
cial security.'0 Likewise, the mention of "salaries" is advocating
increased use of provincial bonds to pay salaries.' 7
Analysis of the opening premise of the February 2000 Memorandum
of Economic Policies (2000 MEP)'0" exemplifies the poor relationship
between the desired ends and the means to achieve them:
The government sees as its foremost priority to create the condi-
tions for the sustainable recovery of economic activity that is
needed to reduce unemployment and poverty in a lasting man-
ner, with continued price stability. These conditions include a
sustained increase in national savings, to finance the needed
growth of investment without further raising the external debt
burden on the economy; and a progressive improvement of the
international competitiveness of local production, within the
framework of the convertibility regime to which the government
is fully committed. Competitiveness will be strengthened by
continued moderation of costs and prices, productivity gains,
wide-ranging structural reforms-especially in the labor market,
102. See generally LOI/MOU, supra note 89.
103. Id. Memorandum 1 6, 9, 10, and II.
104. Id. Memorandum I 11.
105. Patacones are government bonds that have been printed as an alternative to hard
currency and have been used during the recent crisis to pay the salaries of civil servants.
Argentina's Funny Money, WASH. TIMES (Washington, D.C.), June 9, 2002, at B(2); Argen-
tina: One Year of Solitude, BANQUE PARIBAS CONJONCTURE, Oct. 30, 2002, 16, at 26
(describing patacones as "quasi-money"), available at http://research.bnpparibas.com/www/
recheco.nsf/ConjonctureByDateFR/A4DB6F245C88355 1C I 256C4FO04BFBFA/$File/C02 10
_f2.pdfOpenElement. The value of the notes is so questionable that the IMF has pressured
Argentina to refuse them as tax payments. IMF Wants Argentina to Ban Tax Payments with
Bonds-Report, AFX NEws LTD., Oct. 2, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Economic
News. The IMF has since taken the view that provinces should stop using quasi-currencies
such as patacones, which only create a bigger debt burden. Thomas Catdn & Mark Mulligan,
The Daunting Power and Poverty of Buenos Aires: Duhalde's Fragile Government Feels
Threatened by its Most Indebted Province, FIN. TIMES, May 28, 2002, at 4.
106. LOt/MOU, supra note 89, Memorandum 20.
107. Id. Technical Memorandum 113, 6.
108. Argentina-Memorandum of Economic Policies, Feb. 14, 2000 [hereinafter 2000
MEP], available at http://www.imf.org/externallNP/LOI/2000/arg/O1/INDEX.HTM. This
memorandum is an earlier memorandum not to be confused with the "Letter of Intent,
Memorandum of Economic Policies, Technical Memorandum of Understanding," of August
30, 2001, supra note 89.
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the education and health systems, and the financial system-and
by increased competition, as a result of improvements in the
regulatory framework.),9
Thus, the 2000 MEP correctly identifies an end of reduction of "unem-
ployment and poverty in a lasting manner" that is consistent with the
ICESCR (which Argentina ratified in 1986"0). Yet in the same breath it
constructs a method for correction that includes structural reforms in the
labor market (despite ICESCR articles 6 and 7),1 ' the education and
health systems (despite ICESCR articles 12 and 13), 12 and the financial
system (read provincial cuts, use of provincial bonds, currency devalua-
tion, zero-deficit laws, freezes on bank accounts, despite ICESCR
articles I and 11).113 This disregard of the Covenant is worth investigat-
ing further. The following Subsections will analyze the economic, social,
and cultural rights implications of four prominent means of structural
reform in the Argentine context: the "zero-deficit" law, social security,
provincial cuts, and monetary policy changes."1
4
109. Id. $$ 8-9.
110. Treaty Ratification Status, supra note 34.
11I. Article 6 enshrines the right to work, particularly work that one freely chooses or
accepts, and the obligation upon States Parties to provide "technical and vocational guidance
and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and
cultural development and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fun-
damental political and economic freedoms to the individual." ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 6.,
993 U.N.T.S. at 6. Article 7 codifies a right to favorable conditions of work, including remu-
neration adequate to provide for a decent living. Id. art. 7.
112. Article 12 guarantees the "right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attain-
able standard of physical and mental health." ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 12, 993 U.N.T.S. at
8. The ESCR Committee's General Comment on article 12 further specifies that this right
includes an obligation upon States Parties to provide "[flunctioning public health and health-
care facilities, goods and services, as well as programmes." These health care facilities "must
be within safe physical reach for all sections of the population .... affordable for all .... and
of good quality." Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14
on Article 12, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, at 12, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment No. 14]. Article 13 codifies a
right to education. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 13, 993 U.N.T.S. at 8.
113. Article 1 establishes the right to "freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development [and] ... freely dispose of ... natural wealth and resources without prejudice to
any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation." ICESCR, supra note 8,
art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5. Article II enshrines the "right of everyone to an adequate standard of
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the
continuous improvement of living conditions'" Id. art. 11, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
114. For an in-depth critique of yet another specific structural reform policy in Argen-
tina, see Larry Sawers & Raquel Massacane, Structural Reform and Industrial Promotion in
Argentina, 33 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 101 (Feb. 2001). Professor Larry Sawers and economist
Raquel Massacane examine in detail the system of tax subsidies for provincial industries in
Argentina known as industrial promotion. Sawers and Massacane trace the effectiveness of
industrial promotion, beginning with its purported goals of promoting domestic production,
expanding exports, and stimulating small and medium enterprise. Beginning in 1956 with new
tax breaks for companies in Patagonia, what has come to be termed "industrial promotion" is
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1. Zero Deficit
A main theme of the LOI/MOU, as is common to nearly every SAP,
is fiscal austerity measures. In Argentina, this is most widely discussed
in terms of the "zero-deficit law.""5 The LOI/MOU defines "zero-deficit"
as requiring the "Secretary of the Treasury to introduce across-the-board
proportional cuts in primary expenditures (including wages, pensions,
and purchases of goods and services) to ensure that the federal govern-
ment budget is balanced on a cash basis, initially for the period from
August to December 2001.,,116 This type of across-the-board cut to the
government budget can have a harsh effect on the country, inconsistent
with the ICESCR article 2(1), which calls for progressive realization of
the rights recognized in the Covenant."7 Progressive realization does not
lend itself to a deadline, like the December 2001 limit originally agreed
to in the LOIMOU."' In General Comment No. 3, the ESCR Committee
expands on the meaning of progressive realization espoused in article
2(1):
The concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition
of the fact that full realization of all economic, social and cul-
tural rights will generally not be able to be achieved in a short
period of time. In this sense the obligation differs significantly
from that contained in article 2 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights which embodies an immediate obliga-
tion to respect and ensure all of the relevant rights. "9
Thus, the ESCR Committee distinguishes the progressive realization of
the ICESCR from the more immediate protection offered by the ICCPR,
noting that ESC rights cannot normally be achieved with such
really many separate programs enacted at various times in various areas over the next thirty
years, through at least fourteen laws and countless decrees. In Sawers and Massacane's view,
"[s]tructural reform at first blush appears to be a relatively simple process. If the problem is
excessive interference in the market by the government, the solution is simply for the govern-
ment to cease its intervention. If the problem is the wrong kind of intervention, then the
government must simply find and implement policies that are more effective. But two decades
of experience shows that ending some kinds of ineffective or counterproductive manipulation
of the market by the government is neither politically nor administratively simple." Id. at 101.
115. LOI/MOU, supra note 89, Memorandum 6.
116. Id.
117. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 2(l), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
118. See Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3,
Annex I11, 1 I, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990) [hereinafter General Comment No. 3]
(contrasting the majority of ESC rights espoused in the Covenant, which can be achieved
progressively, with the few specific exceptions which are to be achieved immediately).
119. Id. 1 9; see also Williamson, supra note 2, at 8 ("A measured pace of adjustment is
particularly important in countries with a narrow economic base.").
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immediacy. Yet, measures such as the "zero-deficit" law attempt to do
just that. Such reforms are contrary to ICESCR article 2(1).120
, 2. Social Security
The continued restructuring of social security is one of the main
structural changes outlined in the LOI/MOU.' 2 The relevant provision of
the ICESCR is article 9, which "recognize[s] the right of everyone to
social security, including social insurance."' 2  In addition, UDHR article
25 states, "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including ... medical
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event
of unemployment."' 23 Article 2 of the ICESCR specifies that States par-
ties should undertake to realize ESC rights "through international
assistance and co-operation.' '  Thus, the duty to meet this right is shared
by the IME
25
The LOI/MOU suggests that social security can be reformed without
any reduction in coverage, simply by eliminating the abuse of family
120. Furthermore, the recent proposal at the IMF to move toward results-based condi-
tionality, or "financing conditional on previously set outcomes, rather than on the steps toward
those outcomes," Masood Ahmed et al., Refocusing IMF Conditionality, FIN. & DEv., Dec.
2001, at 40, 42, contrasts directly with the language of the ICESCR, stating that "[e]ach State
Party ... undertakes to take steps ... with a view to achieving progressively the full realiza-
tion of the rights recognized in the present Covenant." ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 2(l), 993
U.N.T.S. at 5.
121. LOIMOU, supra note 89, Memorandum T 12.
122. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 9, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
123. UDHR, supra note 9, art. 25.
124. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 2, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5; see also UDHR, supra note 9, art.
22 (specifying that economic, social, and cultural rights will be realized through both
"national effort and international co-operation"); Hitter, supra note 41, at 887 (arguing in
terms of the right to development that governments should meet positive obligations to citi-
zens through international cooperation).
125. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 128-29 (elaborating on the extent of the obligation of the
IMF and the World Bank created by ICESCR article 2). In the context of the Declaration on
the Right to Development, which also uses the "international co-operation" language, Skogly
implicates the World Bank and the IMF because "[o]ne of the most powerful formulations of
development policies occurs throughout the collectivity of States when meeting as the World
Bank and IMF." Id. at 141. The IMF would share in the responsibility of international
cooperation because it itself has international legal personality. See infra Section V.A. But,
because neither the UDHR or the Declaration on the Right to Development are binding
treaties, the responsibility enshrined in UDHR article 22 is only a legal obligation to the extent
that UDHR article 22 is customary international law, a point which is highly contested. See
SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 120-25 (describing the debate surrounding whether the UDHR is, in
whole or in part, customary international law); see also Hurst Hannum, The Status and Future
of the Customary International Law of Human Rights: The Status of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
287 (1996).
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allowances and avoiding duplication of allowances for dependents. 26
Mere streamlining of this sort, the argument goes, is prima facie
compliant with Argentina's obligation under the ICESCR and UDHR,
since it is not taking away substantive entitlements, only eliminating
abuses and externalities. This logic, however, presupposes that the
existing social security system complies with ICESCR article 9, which it
does not: Although article 9 (and UDHR articles 22, 25) states that
"everyone" has the right to social security, 2 estimates of coverage in
Argentina range from as low as 17 percent 11 to a high of 71.4 percent,'
29
with one study showing an 8.8 percent drop in percentage of the
population covered between 1993 and 2000,"0 equivalent to 40,000
people per year losing coverage.' 3 ' Even the most conservative of these
figures leaves Argentina significantly short of satisfying its duty under
article 9.132 A primary reason so many people are not covered is that the
Argentine Social Security system (ANSES) requires a person to work for
thirty years in order to qualify for coverage. 33 Therefore, some of the
alleged "abuses" the LOI/MOU vows to correct may be self-help
attempts by the uninsured to find ways to qualify for the social security
that their government is bound to provide by treaty. In a country so far
from providing the universal coverage it has promised under article 9,
pledges to reduce "abuses" of the system amount to an agreement to
126. LOI/MOU, supra note 89, Memorandum 20.
127. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 9, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7 (recognizing the "right of everyone
to social security, including social insurance").
128. NCPA Policy Group, Reforn in Argentina, PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY IN
LATIN AMERICA, Jan. 1999, at http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s221/s221b.html#argentina [here-
inafter Reform in Argentina] (stating that only one sixth of Argentineans participate in either
of the two social security systems that comprise ANSES (Argentine Social Security system)).
129. Inplementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, Second Periodic Report: Argentina, U.N. Economic and Social Council, 149, U.N.
Doc. E/1990/6/Add.16 (1997) [hereinafter Second Periodic Report of Argentina to the
CESCR]. Fabio Bertranou and coauthors provide an explanation of why such disparate estima-
tions abound regarding social security coverage. They note the inaccuracy of the personal
coverage indicator due to variations in the age group selected and the increasing complexity in
definitions and indicators of coverage due to the 1994 social security reforms in Argentina,
concluding that "[t]he available statistics on coverage, at the moment, have not accompanied
the mentioned changes." Fabio Bertranou et al., Aging and Social Security in Argentina: Insti-
tutions, Public Policies and Challenges (Oct. 2001), at 6-7 (most recent version and
permission to cite provided by author).
130. Bertranou et al., supra note 129, at 9; see also id. at 10 (arguing that "coverage was
growing in the early 1990s but the path reversed after the 1994 reform").
131. Id. at 15.
132. ICESCR article 9 recognizes the "right of everyone to social security, including
social insurance." ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 9, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7 (emphasis added). Even the
highest figure of 71.4 percent is significantly less than "everyone."
133. Reform in Argentina, supra note 128; see also Bertranou et al., supra note 129, at 5.
[Vol. 24:577
The Argentine Case Revisited
move further away from already unmet treaty obligations.'34 The
LOIIMOU also notes that "a minimum contributing wage of Arg$100 a
month has been established," denying benefits to more Argentineans in a
system that is supposed to provide universal coverage. 135
In addition, the 2001 LOI/MOU binds Argentina to further limit the
operating expenses of ANSES to Arg$150 million a year.36 In this re-
spect, it is useful to compare adjustment measures such as social security
reform with Argentina's external debt burden. According to the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO), revenue from individual contributions
and social security taxes slightly exceeded expenditures on social secu-
rity for the three most recent years where data is available 
37
Furthermore, expenditures for those years averaged 4.36 percent of
GNP,3 ' compared to 50 percent of GDP for debt servicing. 39 In fact,
according to one study, the entire social security system currently costs
US$6.7 billion per year. 40 By contrast, Argentina is now spending
US$1.4 billion per month on debt interest payments. 4' In all, the total
savings projected in the LOI/MOU for all reforms to Argentina's social
134. In addition to its treaty obligations, Bertranou and coauthors further note the
increased importance of social security in Argentina due to its rapidly aging society: The
number of elderly per 100 adults has increased from 7 percent in 1950 to 18 percent in 2000
and is projected to reach 32 percent in 2050. Bertranou et al., supra note 129, at 2.
135. LOIIMOU, supra note 89, Memorandum $ 20.
136. Id. $$ 12, 20.
137. Deposits in 1994 represented 5.88 percent of GNP compared to 4.11 percent of
GNP for expenses, resulting in a savings of 1.77 percent of GNP. Deposits in 1995 were 4.51
percent of GNP and expenses were 4.54 percent of GNP, resulting in an expense of .03 percent of
GNP. Deposits in 1996 were 2.8 percent of GNP and expenses 4.44 percent of GNP, resulting in
an overall expense of 1.64 percent of GNP. Averaging these results, social security resulted in a
savings of .03 percent of GNP over the three years considered. Compare Int'l Labor Org., Costo
de la Seguridad Social 1994-96: Gastos, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/
socsec/publ/css/94t96/arge96e.htm [hereinafter 1994-96 Expenditures], with Int'l Labor Org.,
Costo de la Seguridad Social 1994-96. Ingresos, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
protection/socsec/publ/css/94t96/arge96r.htm [hereinafter 1994-96 Deposits]. But see Second
Periodic Report of Argentina to the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, su-
pra note 129, 145 (reporting that 17.1 percent of Argentine public sector spending was for
social security).
138. Expenditures as a percentage of GNP were 4.11, 4.54, and 4.44 for the years 1994,
1995, and 1996, respectively. Thus, the average expenditure for these three years was 4.36
percent. 1994-96 Expenditures, supra note 137.
139. Argentina's Economy: Down, and Almost Out, in Buenos Aires, supra note 57, at
44.
140. Bertranou et al., supra note 129, at 25, table A2 (US$15.4 billion expenditures
minus US$8.7 billion revenues); see also Nicholas Barr, The Truth About Pension Reform,
FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2001, at 6, 8 (arguing that a fiscally sustainable State pension plan "does
not mean that public pension spending must be minimized (as opposed to optimized), but that
it must be compatible with continued economic growth").
141. Argentina's Economy: Down, and Almost Out, in Buenos Aires, supra note 57, at
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security system is Arg$170 million. 42 Argentina pays that amount in in-
terest on its debts about every three days.'43 Instead of concentrating on
the comparatively miniscule costs of the ANSES operating expenses, a
human rights approach would focus on the comparison of social security
to debt servicing.'4 4 Discussion of social security should be limited to
finding a cost-efficient means of providing universal coverage.141
3. Provincial Cuts
A common theme in Argentinean SAPs, and present again in the
LOI/MOU, is heavy cuts to the provincial government budget. ' 4 6 Making
the provinces a focus of fiscal austerity measures, besides being contrary
to the Argentine Constitution,' 47 is a violation of article 2(2) of the
ICESCR, by which State Parties will uphold the Covenant "without dis-
crimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status."'' 48 Citizens of the provinces could fit into at least three of
these protected categories: social origin (being from rural provinces in-
142. LOI/MOU, supra note 89, Memorandum 9.
143. US$1.4 billion per month divided by 31 days times 3 days.
144. Here, the comparison is debt burden to social security, but the same analogy could
be made to the savings gained by provincial cuts, the "zero-deficit" law, currency changes, or
any contemplated structural adjustment measure. The IMF, for its part, has taken to attacking
the debt problem from the other end: In recent negotiations, it has made clear that a new
agreement with Argentina would not replenish Argentina's reserves with money previously
paid to IFIs, hoping that this decision will create an incentive for countries to default earlier
than they otherwise would. El FMI No Devuelve Lo Que El Pais Pag6, LA NACION, Dec. 23,
2002, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar ; see also Buscaglia, supra note 4, at 5 ("It is
hard if not impossible to argument [sic] against the notion that the fiscal deficit was the
immediate cause of the crisis. Simply put, if Argentina's public sector did not have big
external borrowing requirements during the period 1999-2001, there would have been no
crisis."); John Cavanagh, Shifting the Burden of the Debt Crisis, in WORLD DEBT AND THE
HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 1, at 193 (noting that "[tlhe net resource flow out of the Third
World to service ... debt totaled U.S.$168 billion between 1984 and 1989. In this context the
term development must be rethought").
145. See, e.g., Bertranou et al., supra note 129, at 18-23 (describing "four relatively
viable alternatives ... for a pension program that could fulfill the target of providing universal
coverage," ranging in cost between 0.28 percent and 2.16 percent of GDP); see also Barr,
supra note 140, at 8 (arguing that "[r]eform of pensions ... is not an event but a process,
requiring support from all levels of government").
146. LOI/MOU, supra note 89, Memorandum I 11.
147. MUssA, supra note 5, at 14 (noting that the practice by which the provinces retain
much of the initiative and incentive for public spending is enshrined in the Constitution of
Argentina). Because this Note concerns international human rights law, not domestic law of
Argentina, this point is mentioned out of interest only.
148. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
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stead of the urban centers), property (discrimination based on where one
owns property),' 9 and birth (by being born in a provincial area). 50
However, it should be emphasized that the distinction between the
federal government and provincial government is as much a federalist
distinction of government power sharing as it is a geographic distinction
between the cities and rural areas. In fact, the most indebted province is
that of Buenos Aires.'5 ' Nevertheless, the IMF solution to the Buenos
Aires provincial debt disproportionately burdens other rural provinces.
For example, although the IMF requested that all provinces cut their
budget deficits by 60 percent, "senior IMF officials say in private that the
biggest problem is Buenos Aires itself, which accounts for more than
half the combined spending deficit of 23 provinces."'52 Not only will
provincial cuts outside of Buenos Aires province amount to less savings
than cuts in Buenos Aires,'53 but they will disproportionately burden
those provinces to correct a problem they did not create.
These cuts are so severe that there is no money left in the budget to
pay provincial employees, who have been paid using provincial bonds
called patacones, which are not necessarily honored in stores.'54 To the
extent that payment in patacones is limited to provincial civil servants or
is not universally adopted, it is a violation of ICESCR article 7, which
guarantees "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favorable
conditions of work which ensure, in particular... fair wages and equal
remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind.""'
Not being true legal and tender money, patacones cannot be considered
equal remuneration for their work within the language of article 7. Mer-
chants are in no way legally bound to accept patacones, so in many
transactions they may be of no value at all. When patacones are ac-
cepted, they may be highly devalued, since that merchant will likely
have the same trouble trying to spend them."'
On the other hand, patacones represent an attempt by Argentina to
continue to pay employees despite lack of funds. In this way, patacones
149. The United Nations notes that "[t]he rural poor are mostly landless or have farms
that are too small to yield an adequate income. As a consequence, there is a strong correlation
between rural poverty and asset deprivation." WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
OVERVIEW REPORT, supra note 43, 111l.
150. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5. ("The States Parties to the pre-
sent Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will
be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to ... social origin, property [or] birth.").
151. Catin & Mulligan, supra note 105.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See supra note 105.
155. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 7, 993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
156. See Argentina's Funny Money, supra note 105 ("[S]hopkeepers take them reluc-
tantly in exchange for food, since they have few prospects of getting real cash.").
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work both in support of and contrary to ESC rights. If they are not being
used universally, they violate ICESCR article 7(a).' 57 However, in light of
severe lack of government funds, patacones represent a desperate at-
tempt to continue to meet Covenant obligations by providing some
remuneration for work.' In this light, it is the subsequent IMF opposi-
tion to patacones, because of the additional provincial debt they create,' 59
that violates ICESCR article 7(a), since it would then be denying the
workers of any remuneration. '0
Pedro Pou, Governor of the Central Bank of Argentina, recently
wrote in Finance and Development (a periodical published by the IMF)
that "provincial governments continue to depend on taxes raised at the
federal level, while the municipalities depend on taxes raised at the pro-
vincial level," continuing to remark that "[a] system needs to be
developed that improves the balance, at each level of government, be-
tween the political benefits of public services and the political costs of
raising revenues."'6 ' Pou's argument is consistent with the LOI/MOU,
which calls to "reform the revenue sharing arrangement between the fed-
eral government and the provinces to ... allow for a better match of each
province's share with its own revenue effort."'' 62 Such logic, however,
undermines the whole premise of taxation as a form of wealth redistribu-
tion.' 63 If taxes truly operated on Pou's presumption that each individual
should get what she pays for, a society could simply eliminate most
taxes and all government funded social services, and everyone could
self-insure for the services they need. But, according to the ICESCR,
there are certain entitlements a State Party is obligated to provide, re-
157. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
158. Catin & Mulligan, supra note 105 (noting that the provincial government feels it
"cannot start firing people at a time when more more [sic] than half of [its] constituents live
below the poverty line").
159. Id.
160. Presumably, the IMF is not advocating payment in pesos instead of patacones,
since that would create an equivalent debt.
161. Pedro Pou, Argentina's Structural Reforms of the 1990s, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 2000, at
13, 15.
162. LOI/MOU, supra note 89,118.
163. 51 AGUSTIN JOSE MENENDEZ, JUSTIFYING TAXES: SOME ELEMENTS FOR A GEN-
ERAL THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC TAX LAW '1200 (Francisco J. Laporta et al. eds., 2001) ("It is
probably not too adventurous to assume that if ... [wealth redistribution] is considered a le-
gitimate purpose of political action, the tax system will be at the heart of the institutional
mechanisms to implement it."); see also Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate
Tax, I I TAX L. REV. 223, 226-36 (1956) (noting that proponents of the estate tax in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries often stress its usefulness in preventing the concentration of
wealth); C. Ronald Chester, Inheritance and Wealth Taxation in a Just Society, 30 RUTGERS L.
REV. 62, 93-100 (1976) (providing a modern defense of taxation as a means of wealth redis-
tribution).
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gardless of a person's economic means, including health care, ' 64 educa-* 165 fredo1fran
tion, freedom from hunger, 66 and social security.' These minimum
obligations have also been recognized by the Committee in the principle
of core obligations:
[T]he Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation
to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential
levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party.
Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number
of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most
basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its
obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read
in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obliga-
tion, it would be largely deprived of its raison d'tre."'68
Thus, a State which is compliant with the Covenant is inevitably a
welfare state in at least some capacity, which involves taxation as wealth
redistribution.' This principle is embodied in UDHR article 28, which
states, "Everyone is entitled to a social ... order in which the rights and
164. For example, the ESCR Committee has explained that "health facilities, goods and
services must be affordable for all. Payment for health-care services, as well as services re-
lated to the underlying determinants of health, has to be based on the principle of equity,
ensuring that these services, whether privately or publicly provided, are affordable for all,
including socially disadvantaged groups. Equity demands that poorer households should not
be disproportionately burdened with health expenses as compared to richer households." Gen-
eral Comment No. 14, supra note 112, 12(b)(iii).
165. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 13(2)(a), 993 U.N.T.S. at 8 ("Primary education shall be
... available free to all.").
166. Id. art. 11(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 7; see also Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12, 13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999)
(explaining that the right to food under article II includes a duty on the State Party to facili-
tate accessibility to food, and that "particularly impoverished segments of the population may
need attention through special programmes").
167. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 9, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
168. General Comment No. 3, supra note 118, 110.
169. WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW REPORT, supra note 43,
127 ("While employment and social security programmes are the major factors determining
who falls into or escapes from poverty, a variety of other social and economic factors are also
influential, including the tax structure..") (emphasis added). This is sometimes framed in the
language of decentralization of social services. Id. 87-89 (noting that "[I]n most countries
that have elaborate State systems of social provision and where the State plays a major role in
directing the economy, the trend in thinking over the past several decades has been towards
decentralization" which "should remain an important longer-term goal"); see also id. '1I 60-63
(arguing the importance of a governmental structure which enhances "social integration, par-
ticularly of the more disadvantaged and marginalized groups:' and noting that "[t]his is not the
first time in recent history that humanity has faced such a challenge. The founding of the
United Nations, itself a response to deep-seated crises in the decades of the 19 20s and 1930s,
... ushered in the full-fledged welfare State").
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freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized."' 7 The peo-
ple in all provinces are entitled to the same core obligations under the
ICESCR, regardless of their inability to pay the same level of taxes.
Thus, all provinces should not be expected to generate tax revenue to
fund government operations in the same way the federal government
can, and this argument for provincial cuts should not be recognized.'
7
'
Rather, structural adjustment should recognize any provincial spending
which addresses the high level of rural poverty. 172
Provincial cuts are justified by the IMF to compensate for past frivo-
lous spending in the provinces by incumbents to gain important swing
votes in elections.' 73 Recognizing and stopping wasteful spending is cer-
tainly a legitimate goal of the IMF in supporting fiscal austerity, and
Argentina should avoid all such irresponsible expenditures. But, a solu-
tion which aims to correct for past State wrongs by present-day harm to
individuals flies in the face of human rights norms: Instead of protecting
individuals against their government, the solution would punish indi-
viduals because of their government.'74
4. Convertibility, Devaluation, and Their Effects
Convertibility (linking the peso at parity with the U.S. dollar and
constraining monetary policy to support this peg),'75 devaluation, and
other forms of monetary control (hereinafter referred to as "monetary
policy") are perhaps the most difficult areas to establish human rights
culpability of the IMF. First, unlike the other categories previously dis-
cussed, they are not among those issues that Argentina contracted to
170. UDHR, supra note 9, art. 28.
171. LARRY SAWERS, THE OTHER ARGENTINA: THE INTERIOR AND NATIONAL DEVEL-
OPMENT 141-64 (1996) (outlining in detail the lack of economic resources in the Argentine
provinces). Sawers concludes that "[t]he poverty and inequality of the interior translate into
fiscal backwardness. The poor do not have much taxable income or wealth. The inequality in
the distribution of income and wealth ... leads to political inequality .... The middle class in
the interior is too small to serve as the principal tax base. A government without resources
cannot build the infrastructure that promotes economic growth." Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
172. WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW REPORT, supra note 43,
110 (noting that 61 percent of the rural population in Latin America is poor).
173. Catin & Mulligan, supra note 105.
174. Provincial finance remains a major issue in the current negotiations. Mds Ajustes Pro-
vinciales para 2003, LA NACION, Nov. 17, 2002, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar. See
also Duhalde Pedird Mds Ajuste a las Provincias para Acordar con el FMI, LA NACION, Nov. 17,
2002, available at http://www.lanacion.com (describing President Duhalde's attempt to reach
an agreement with the IMF, causing him to pressure the provinces into more adjustment by
threatening imminent anarchy).
175. MUssA, supra note 5, at 5.
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change in the 2001 LOIIMOU.'76 Monetary policy issues also differ from
those previously discussed, because even if detrimental changes in
monetary policy could be linked to SAPs, it is much more difficult than
in other areas to establish a violation of ESC rights because of the inher-
ent economic complexities involved: great economists, indeed the
world's best economists, differ even with 20/20 hindsight on the most
prudent decisions of monetary policy. 7  Just as the IMF is required under
its Articles of Agreement to support a national policy as long as it has at
least a reasonable chance of success, 78 so would it be difficult in the hu-
man rights context to place blame in hindsight for reasonable choices
made by highly trained policy makers simply because the choice they
made turned out to be wrong. Both because monetary policy is not di-
rectly addressed in the LOIIMOU, and because it has no "right answer"
even in ESC-rights terms, this Section takes on a different character from
the previous ones, attempting to expose evidence of times in which the
IMF was pressuring Argentina to adopt a certain monetary policy with-
out specifically mandating it in the LOI/MOU.
As stated above, exchange rate decisions are a complex area of in-
ternational economic policy, and this Note does not attempt analysis of
the policy in economic terms.' 79 Indeed, in terms of the ICESCR article
176. See generally LOI/MOU, supra note 89. Devaluation and monetary policy are not
discussed at all. Convertibility is mentioned once as afait accompli, but no new convertibility
arrangements are agreed upon. Id. at 3.
177. For example, even Joseph Stiglitz, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001,
provides a disclaimer when analyzing IMF policy: "My point ... is not to resolve these con-
troversies, or to push for my particular conception of the role of government and markets, but
to emphasize that there are real disagreements about these issues among even well-trained
economists." JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 220 (2002). Com-
pare, e.g., Sdrgio Pereira Leite, Human Rights-and the IMF, 38 FIN. & DEV., Dec. 1, 2001, at
45 ("It has been shown ... that external trade promotes growth ... [and] that, despite transi-
tional costs, trade liberalization generally has a positive overall effect on the employment and
income of the poor.") with MUSSA, supra note 5, at 220 ("the problem is that the IMF... pre-
sents as received doctrine propositions and policy recommendations for which there is not
widespread agreement; indeed, in the case of capital market liberalization, there was scant
evidence in support and a massive amount of evidence against"). Michael Mussa, Director of
Research at the IMF for a decade, also stated "there is room for reasonable disagreement
about what are the right assumptions concerning real growth, interest rates, and achievable
fiscal outcomes." MUSSA, supra note 5, at 78. Perhaps most candidly of all, former Finance
Minister of Argentina Domingo Cavallo stated recently at a conference on the Argentine crisis
at the University of Michigan that "Argentines are confused, and I am one of them." Alberto
Armendiriz, Cavallo Dijo que No Hay Que Echarle la Culpa al Fondo, LA NACION, Oct. 24,
2002, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/02/l0/24/de_443448.asp (hypothesizing in
hindsight that perhaps the Argentine crisis could have been avoided if the peso was allowed to
float in 1997 or if in 1999 it had been pegged to the U.S. dollar and the euro) (translation by
the author).
178. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 24 (citing Articles of Agreement art. IV, sec. 2).
179. WILFRED L. DAVID, THE IMF POLICY PARADIGM 83 (1985) ("One of the most con-
troversial, and indeed complex, aspects of IMF policy packages concerns the inordinate
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1(1) guarantee of a right-to self-determination, including the right of a
people to "freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment,""'8 commentators are divided as to the extent that the IMF has
pressured Argentine convertibility decisions. For example, former IMF
chief economist Michael Mussa argues in his recent book Argentina and
the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy that it was the Argentine govern-
ment alone that designed and implemented the convertibility plan
directly against IMF advice."' Moreover, several commentators have
described convertibility as a right in itself, including the right to peg a
currency to another currency or use another currency. 82 This being said,
convertibility decisions by governments still present interesting human
rights questions: Even when the decision is made by a government on
behalf of its people (consistent with the right to self-determination), its
result is prima facie open to question from the standpoint of economic
self-determination, since it is the economic situation of a far-away land
which controls the economy of Argentina, not the work or decisions of
people on the ground.'83
degree of emphasis placed on exchange rate depreciation, or devaluation, especially in those
developing countries whose exchange rates are tied to major currencies."). For an economic
analysis of exchange rate policy, see Ronald I. McKinnon, Limiting Moral Hazard and Reduc-
ing Risk in International Capital Flows: The Choice of an Exchange Rate Regime, 579
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & SOC. Sct. 200 (2002).
180. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 1(]), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
181. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 5.
182. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 404 (2001) (describing the ability of a
country to regulate its currency, including pegging it to another currency, as a right in itself,
created with the elimination of the gold standard in 1978); Domingo Cavallo & Eduardo
Cavallo, Argentina 2002: When the Attempt to Set "Prices Right" Destroyed "Property
Rights", (Oct. 22, 2002) (manuscript at 1) (Paper presented at the Symposium on the
Argentine Crisis, University of Michigan Business School), available at http://
www.cavallo.com.ar (describing convertibility as "a right that Argentines demanded and until
then had been denied: the right to use foreign currencies, in particular the US dollar, to protect
their savings").
183. Mussa concedes this point, noting that "Argentina was surely not part of an
optimum currency area with the United States, because the Argentine economy was subject to
much different shocks from the US economy and the monetary policy appropriate for
Argentina need not generally coincide with that appropriate for the United States" MUSSA,
supra note 5, at 22. Of course, economic trends are in a sense "uncontrollable" by the daily
actions of a people anyway, and can only be controlled by government to a certain extent, but
this is literally the case when a currency peg is used. Moreover, the modified currency peg
proposed in April 2001 and initiated later in the year (tying the peso 50 percent to the dollar
and 50 percent to the euro) complicated matters of economic sovereignty even further, with
the value of Argentine money then determined by twelve other countries. DePalma, supra note
63, § 4, at 4; Argentina's Economy: At Last, A Deal, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2001, at 36. (The
twelve euro countries at that time were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The History of the European
Union: 2002, at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/history/2002/2002_en.htm. The dual exchange
rate lasted several months and was then discontinued. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 62; Argentina's
Crisis: Loaded Dice, ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2002, at 36. This is usually what the policy makers
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The situation is even more complicated by, evidence of pressure by
the IMF on Argentina regarding its exchange rate regime. The Economist
notes that:
The IMF's official position is that ... exchange-rate arrange-
ments are a sovereign decision. "Countries choose their own
exchange-rate regime and we determine whether we support it,"
says Tom Dawson, the IMF spokesman.... In part, this is a real
change of philosophy: since the arrival of Horst Kohler, the
Fund's German boss, the IMF takes country "ownership" of eco-
nomic reforms more seriously.'
Dawson's statement is a half truth. Stanley Please, a former consultant
and employee at the World Bank, noted quite to the contrary, that
"[r]esponsibility for exchange rate policy at the international level
resides with the IME Under its Articles of Agreement, the IMF was
mandated: 'To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange
arrangements among members and to avoid competitive exchange
depreciation.""" He further contends that such exchange-rate policy
management most often occurs not in the aggregate but through a
"country-by-country approach.'' 86
Furthermore, even if it were true that the IMF did not officially con-
trol the exchange rate, it possesses enormous unofficial bargaining power
as lender of last resort (LLR), causing countries to predict what the IMF
will support and to choose that option. For example, in the Argentine
are after, precisely because the American (and European) economy is historically less volatile
than the economy whose currency is being pegged. Indeed, between 1935 and 1991, before
the peso was pegged to the U.S. dollar, its value fell against the dollar by a factor of three
trillion times. Id. Another aspect of the exchange rate regime is the cost to the IMF (and
ultimately the country concerned) to maintain artificial exchange rates. Joseph Stiglitz, ex-
president of the World Bank who has become the IMF's most vocal critic, notes that the IMF
"justifies these interventions on the grounds that sometimes markets exhibit excessive
pessimism." STIGLITZ, supra note 177, at 198. He finds it "curious that an institution
committed to the doctrine that markets work well, if not perfectly, should decide that this one
market-the exchange rate market-requires such massive intervention[,]" adding that "[tihe
IMF has never put forward a good explanation either for why this expensive intervention is
desirable in this particular market-or why it is undesirable in other markets." Id. Answering
his own question, he notes that "[w]hen the IMF and the Brazilian government, for instance,
spent some $50 billion maintaining the exchange rate at an overvalued level in late 1998,
where did the money go? The money doesn't disappear into thin air. It goes into somebody's
pocket-much of it into the pockets of the speculators." Id. at 198-99.
184. The IMF and Argentina: Staying Mum, ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2001, at 30.
185. STANLEY PLEASE, THE HOBBLED GIANT: ESSAYS ON THE WORLD BANK 60-61
(1984) (noting that "[t]he IMF becomes operationally involved in issues of exchange rate
adjustment in the context of the use of IMF resources by individual member governments").
186. Id. Certainly, IMF policy on exchange rates may have changed since 1984 when
Please wrote his book, but his point that official surveillance of exchange rates is written into
the Articles of Agreement remains salient.
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context the Economist notes: "On December 5th [2001], the Fund said
that it was 'unable at this stage to recommend completion' of its review
of Argentina's loan programme. Translation: it will not release the last
tranche of its latest loan, worth $1.3 billion, unless the government either
adopts the dollar, or devalues.""'7 The Latin America Weekly Report also
noted IMF pressure on exchange rate policy, stating that in the ongoing
talks between the IMF and Argentina in October 2002, there "remain
some disagreements over the exchange system (the IMF reportedly
wanting to rule out central bank intervention)."'' 8 Thus, although mone-
tary decisions are not officially mandated by the LOI/MOU, and despite
evidence that Argentina has adopted policies contradicting IMF advice,
there is also evidence to suggest that countries, including Argentina,
sometimes face unofficial pressure from the IMF to make these deci-
sions. Because these decisions implicate ESC rights, they are briefly
addressed here.
Devaluation raises other serious human rights questions. As a gen-
eral matter, by devaluing a currency, as President Duhalde did by 29
percent in early January 2002, the government is changing the value of
citizens' savings in the tick of the clock. 8 9 In so doing, devaluation vio-
lates the ICESCR article 25, which notes the "inherent right of all
peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and re-
sources." '90 More specifically, this often has a large effect on the price of
daily food staples,' 9' contrary to ICESCR article 11(1), codifying the
right of everyone to "an adequate standard of living for himself and his
family, including adequate food," and article 11(2), recognizing the
"fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger."' 92 Furthermore,
because most mortgages in Argentina are taken out in dollars while most
wages are paid in pesos,' 93 citizens with property are at a unique disad-
187. Argentina's Economy: Strapped for Cash, supra note 64, at 36. Jorge Oviedo, editor
at the daily La Nacion, blames the IMF for requiring the floating of the currency, calling this
the biggest of many catastrophic errors committed by the IMF in Argentina. Jorge Oviedo,
Aparecen las Razones del Fondo, LA NACION, Nov. 21, 2002, available at http://
www.lanacion.com.ar.
188. And Yes, There Are Still Unsolved Issues with the IMF, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Oct.
15, 2002, at 482. Pressure on currency decisions also came from foreign private investors. See
S. Neal McKnight, Stepping Stones to Reform: The Use of Capital Controls in Economic Lib-
eralization, 82 VA. L. REv. 859 (1996) ("Argentina ... was under significant pressure [from
foreign investors] to abandon its currency board system and devalue its currency....
189. Devaluation's Downbeat Start, EcONOMIST, Jan. 12, 2002, at 34.
190. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 25, 993 U.N.T.S. at 10.
191. See Baldacci et al., supra note 54, at 25 ("The currency depreciation may also affect
consumer prices, and the higher cost of imported food hurts poor individuals and households
that spend much of their income on food.").
192. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 11,993 U.N.T.S. at 7.
193. Devaluation's Downbeat Start, supra note 189, at 34 ("Most mortgages and loans
were taken out in dollars, while wages are mainly in pesos.").
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vantage, contrary to ICESCR article 2(2) (preventing economic dis-
crimination based on property), and against the spirit of article 11(1)
(noting the importance of adequate housing to an individual and fam-
ily).' 94 Finally, the poorest people in Argentina are more likely to have
their savings in pesos. In contrast, wealthy individuals, banks, and corpo-
rations usually save in dollars or other hard currencies.' Therefore,
devaluation disproportionately discriminates against the poor, a violation
of article 2(2), which, by banning discrimination based on property, im-
plicitly bans discrimination based on wealth, or amount of property.' 96
Many of the recent tactics of current President Duhalde to deal with
the flailing economy exemplify human rights-conscious decision mak-
ing: The Economist has consistently noted that the Duhalde government
has attempted to focus the pressure of devaluation on banks and large,
privatized utilities (several of which are Spanish owned), and away from
individuals.'97 The Economist has noted, however, that "outside help,"
meaning IMF approval, will be conditioned on "more even-handed
treatment of the banks."' 98 While President Duhalde is trying to protect
his citizens, the macroeconomic pressure from the outside is more inter-
ested in banks and privatized enterprise. In the context of devaluation,
the right to development and right to self-determination resurface again.
This problem has two levels. First, policy considerations on
devaluation must take into account ICESCR article 1(2), which
establishes the primacy of individual use of wealth and resources over
international economic cooperation. ' Second, in the event that policy
considerations do attempt to consider individuals over outside factors,
but are effectively prevented from doing so by outside IFIs holding the
purse strings, article 11(1) comes into play, stressing the "essential
importance of international co-operation based on free consent."20 The
threat that the IMF will deny financing prevents President Duhalde from
making a policy choice consistent with article 1(2) that shifts the blow of
194. ICESCR, supra note 8, arts. 2(2), 11(l), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5, 7.
195. See Devaluation's Downbeat Start, supra note 189, at 34.
196. ICESCR, supra note 8, arts. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5 ("The States Parties to the pre-
sent Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will
be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to ... property.").
197. Devaluation's Downbeat Start, supra note 189, at 34; Argentina Survival Struggle,
supra note 69, at 31.
198. Argentina Survival Struggle, supra note 69, at 31.
199. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 1(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5 ("All peoples may, for their own
ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations
arising out of international economic co-operation").
200. Id. art. 11(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 7 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-
nize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living .... The States Parties will take
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential
importance of international co-operation based on free consent.").
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devaluation from banks to individuals. Thus, the international
cooperation between the Duhalde government and the IFIs is not based
on consent, as mandated in article 11(1). In this way, articles 1(2) and
11 (1) form a sort of hierarchy in the right to development and right to
self-determination context: Article 1(2) protects individual choice from
an overpowering government, and article 11(1) protects government
choice from an overpowering international community. Article 1 (1) is
therefore an important link in considering the new human rights
paradigm of structural adjustment. 20 ' This premise will be examined
more thoroughly later in the discussion.
Another problem with devaluation, or the outright "floating" of the
peso which occurred in early February 2002,202 is that other techniques
must then be employed to maintain a stable economy, to prevent a
floating peso from leading to hyperinflation, violating these same human
rights provisions by different means. Unfortunately, the techniques to
stabilize the Argentine economy in the face of an impending currency
float are themselves in violation of ESC rights. One such policy in
Argentina is the corralito, Spanish for little fence, a government
mandated freeze on savings accounts, initiated to prevent a run on the
banks. The exact details of the corralito seemed to change with the hour,
but essentially it limited the amount Argentineans could withdraw from
their bank accounts to US$ 1000 per month, and prevented the transfer of
money abroad without approval of the Economic Ministry.0 3 This is a
violation of ICESCR article 1(2) right of everyone to "freely dispose of
,,2'4 ththeir natural wealth and resources, and t e UDHR's article 17 right
that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."205
Furthermore, the corralito policy discriminates based on wealth, and
is thus a violation of the ICESCR article 2(2)'s prohibition of discrimi-
nation based on property2°6 in two ways. First, a government decision in
early December 2001 to change the amount of cash Argentinean tourists
201. General Comment No. 12 on article II specifically clarifies that "international co-
operation" was meant to reference, among other organizations, the IMF. General Comment No.
12, supra note 166, $ 41. ICESCR article II does not deal with ESC rights generally but rather
with the right to an "adequate standard of living .... including adequate food, clothing and hous-
ing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions." ICESCR, supra note 8, art 11(1),
993 U.N.T.S. at 7. But General Comment No. 12 on article I I makes clear that the language
concerning international cooperation was meant to apply to all ESC right by referring in General
Comment No. 12, paragraph 41 to General Comment No. 2, paragraph 9. In General Comment
No. 2, paragraph 9, the Committee speaks to the burden of structural adjustment on all ESC
rights. See General Comment No. 2, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
202. Argentina's Crisis: Loaded Dice, supra note 183, at 36.
203. Argentina's Economy: Strapped for Cash, supra note 64, at 36.
204. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 1(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
205. UDHR, supra note 9, art. 17.
206. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24:577
The Argentine Case Revisited
can take abroad from US$1000 to US$10,000 7 (while leaving the bank
freeze the same) discriminates against the poor, since they are less likely
to participate in international tourism. Second, it has been argued by
several professors at the University of Michigan Business School that
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) have been heavily employed in
Argentina as a method of capital flight."8 This additional loophole also
discriminates against the poor, who are less likely to have the funds or
expertise to invest in the stock market to protect their assets.
Argentineans absolutely despise the corralito, and it was this fact
more than anything else that prompted the pot-banging protests that
made headlines around the world, left more than twenty-five people
dead, and prompted Fernando de la Rua to resign as president in
December 2001.'°' In the widely-publicized decision of Smith v. Estado
Nacional, the Supreme Court of Argentina declared such a freeze to be
unconstitutional on February 1, 2002.20 Although both the Argentine
public and the Argentine Supreme Court were against the mechanism,
the government continued to impose it for most of the year. Instead of
abiding by the Supreme Court decision, President Duhalde used the
"emergency economic powers" granted to him in the Argentine
207. Argentina's Economy: Strapped for Cash, supra note 64, at 36.
208. Sebastian Auguste et al., Cross-Border Trading as a Mechanism for Capital Flight:
ADRs and the Argentine Crisis, (Oct. 22, 2002) (Paper presented at the Symposium on
the Argentine Crisis, University of Michigan Business School), available at http://
www.econ.isa.umich.edu/-burstein/seminar/ADRs%20and%20the%2OArgentine%20crisis.%
20Nov%202002.pdf. American Depository Receipts, commonly known as "ADRs," are
"shares of non-U.S. (in this case Argentine) corporations sold in the U.S. (and denominated in
dollars)." Id. (manuscript at I n.1). Created to allow "firms in foreign markets to enjoy the
advantages of greater liquidity, transparency and access to the U.S. capital market" and to allow
for easy diversificaton for U.S. investors, id. (manuscript at 3), Auguste and coauthors show that
Argentine investors were able to use them to transfer up to roughly US$835 million to US$3.4
billion between December 1, 2001 and May, 2002 out of Argentina despite the corralito policy,
by buying Argentine stocks and then selling their stock as ADRs in the United States for dollars.
Id. (manuscript at 2). This practice is exemplified by a 25 percent increase in stock market
activity following the instatement of the corralito, despite falling stock prices. Id. at I (citing
Joshua Goodman, Argentines Dust Off Their Survival Skills, Bus. WK., Dec. 24, 2001, at 48, and
Paul Luke, Cavallo's Days as Argentina Finance Minister Could Be Numbered, INVEST AVENUE,
Dec. 10, 2001, available at http://www.investavenue.com/article.html?ID=3307 ("The reason the
market is going up is simply that the stock market is seen as a way of protecting assets and a
means, by ADR conversion, of getting money out of Argentina")). Auguste and coauthors add
that, after February 2002, Argentine investors employed a similar tactic using Certificados de
Depositos Argentinos (CEDEARs), essentially the reverse of ADRs, "shares of non-Argentine
firns (mostly U.S. firms) cross-listed on the Argentine exchange." Auguste et al., supra,
(manuscript at 24-26).
209. Argentina's Crisis: Floating into the Unknown, supra note 65; Thneline:
Argentina-A Chronology of Key Events, supra note 60.
210. Smith v. Estado Nacional, [2002-i J.A. 237 (Feb. 1, 2002); see also La Corte Puse
Fin al Corellito, DIARIO JUDICIAL (Feb. 1, 2002), available at www.diariojudicial.com/
nota.asp?ID=9741 &Estilo= I &Pagina=nota.asp?ID=974 I.
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Congress's January 5-6, 2002 emergency weekend session to ban further
legal challenges to the savings freeze by presidential decree."'
Furthermore, the government coalition in Congress even attempted
unsuccessful impeachment proceedings against the Court. The Court, for
its part, retaliated, granting injunctions to return deposits to tens of
thousands of savers.2 3 The corralito restrictions were finally significantly
eased in October and November 2002, and abolished on December 2,
2002.14
The corralito brings us full circle in the cycle: from the "zero-
deficit '215 mandate of the IMF, influencing decisions on monetary policy
which necessitated the bank freeze. Yet, ironically, the IMF eventually
pushed Argentina to abandon the corralito.2 6 Certainly, in an economy
as volatile as Argentina's, no one can be sure before or after the fact ex-
actly what result any policy measure can or did have. In that sense,
perhaps it is perfectly reasonable for the IMF to wish for devaluation one
day, yet decry its result (the corralito) on another day. It is worth
reiterating that this Note does not attempt to establish which economic
policy led to which result, or to judge any policy on its economic merit.
Instead, this Section argued that regardless of the cause or effect of
devaluation, convertibility, and the corralito, each have human rights
implications under the ICESCR which should be taken into account.
D. Creditor Confidence
After outlining the major elements of structural adjustment dis-
cussed above, the LOI/MOU states: "The government believes that a
firm implementation of the policies outlined in the paragraphs below will
boost confidence both at home and abroad, contributing to increased
availability and lower costs of financing for Argentine borrowers. 27 Be-
ginning with the legitimate end of reducing poverty, the IMF elevates
creditor confidence to an end in itself; the driving force behind SAPs is
211. Devaluation's Downbeat Start, supra note 189, at 34; Argentina's Crisis: Floating
into the Unknown, supra note 65, at 32.
212. Argentina's Collapse: Progress, of Sorts, supra note 49, at 34; Argentina's Crisis:
Floating into the Unknown, supra note 65, at 32.
213. Argentina's Crisis: Waiting for the IMF to Tango, supra note 66, at 31.
214. Deal with IMF Expected This Week: Rift with Supreme Court May Soon Be Over,
LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Oct. 8, 2002, at 470; Se Restituirian Hasta $20.000 Del Corral6n, LA
NACION, Nov. 27, 2002, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar; El Procurador General, En
Contra del Corralito, LA NACION, Nov. 21, 2002, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar;
Termina El Corralito, Un Ailo Despuds, LA NACION, Dec. 2, 2002, available at http://
www.lanacion.com.ar.
215. LOI/MOU, supra note 89, Memorandum 9 6.
216. IMF Wants Argentina to Suspend the 'Corralito,' GAZETA MERCANTIL INVEST
NEWS (Apr. 10, 2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, Economic News.
217. 2000 MEP, supra note 108,99.
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thus to make a country appear macroeconomically sound to creditors and
investors, regardless of what the reality is for people on the ground.2 8 In
this way, creditor confidence is a sort of "intermediate" end, which can
become the means toward "true" ends of unemployment and poverty
reduction.2 9 The reality is that not only does this intermediate goal be-
come the primary focus, ironically swallowing up the "true" end in an
effort to reach this "intermediate" end, but this "intermediate" end is it-
self illegitimate from the standpoint of the ICESCR: As outlined above,
the ICESCR article 1(2) places the effect of "international economic co-
operation" at odds with the right of a people to dispose of their natural
wealth and resources.22°
In order to understand why the confidence of private creditors would
matter in a deal between an intergovernmental lending organization and
a sovereign nation, one must understand the role of the IMF in
consolidating and guiding lending by all the key stakeholders. For
example, the December 2000 financial support package of the IMF was
for US$40 billion, but only US$14 billion of that money was from the
IMF itself. Also included was US$5 billion from the Inter-American
Development Bank and the World Bank, US$1 billion from Spain, and
(the largest of all) US$20 billion from the private sector.22' This creates an
interesting situation where the IMF is committing money from the private
sector, but the private sector, made up of individual self-interested actors,
are not themselves bound by this commitment. These investors will only
help the IMF to meet its goals if they feel it is profitable for them.2
218. See SKOGLY, supra note 8, at 20-26.
219. See id.
220. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 1(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
221. Press Release 01/3, International Monetary Fund (Jan. 12, 2001), cited in MUSSA,
supra note 5, at 31; see also LOI/MOU, supra note 89, Memorandum '1114 ("Private sector
involvement in financing the fiscal program in 2001 is expected to reach about
US$15 billion"); Cavanagh, supra note 144, at 194 (noting that private banks lent 62 percent
of total debt to the developing world in 1987); id. at 201 (noting that most debt in the develop-
ing world is owed to private banks); AGLIETTA & MOATTI, supra note 49, at 67 (noting that
"[l]es banques commerciales, qui ne sont gure en mesure d'imposer des conditions 6conomi-
ques aux emprunteurs souverains et de surveiller leur respect, subordonn rent leurs
nrgociations avec les pays emprunteurs la conclusion d'un accord avec le Fonds [commer-
cial banks, which are hardly in a position to impose economic conditions on sovereign
borrowers or monitor such conditions, subordinate their negotations with borrowing States to
an agreement with the Fund]").
222. This is a bit like telling your friend "if you give me your apple, I'll get the drugstore
to sell you a notebook for a nickel." Regardless of the deal between you and your friend, the
drugstore will only make that sale if it is profitable for it. See, e.g., Joan M. Nelson, Stabiliza-
tion, Growth, and Equity: The Narrowing Parameters of Debate, in WORLD DEBT AND THE
HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 1, at 13, 19 (noting that government policy "choices cannot
be entirely guided by the goal of minimizing impact on the poor. Other goals of public policy
and consideration of administrative and political feasibility are also important. One important
objective is regaining the confidence of businesses and potential investors... ).
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Thus, ensuring creditor confidence is the only way the IMF can
guarantee the kind of private support it writes into its loan packages.
This situation is exacerbated by the IMF's status as the preferred
creditor. Former Director of Research for the IMF Michael Mussa notes
that the IMF and other suppliers of official support "will surely and
rightfully insist that their claims be fully serviced, and this potentially
diminishes the resources available to meet the claims of Argentina's
private creditors. 223 In this way, the IMF's status as lender of last resort
is hurting creditor confidence. Instead of solving this problem by sharing
the default burden with private creditors (a solution which would
increase monetary risk for the IMF), the IMF attempts to increase
creditor confidence through insistence on fiscal austerity (a solution
which would increase risk of violation of ESC rights).224
The importance of creditor confidence cannot be overstated. Stiglitz
notes that attempts in Ecuador and Romania to condition IMF support on
private creditor debt forgiveness proved a dismal failure.225 Similarly, in
his description of IMF complicity in the Argentine crisis, Mussa
continuously raises the importance of creditor confidence in the
international financial architecture. For example, he explicitly states that
"[t]hough the responsibility of the Fund is not to maximize returns to
private creditors, it cannot serve the important interests of all its
members in an efficiently functioning international financial system by
ignoring the legitimate concerns of private creditors., 26 He gives an
example in Russia, whereby the IMF required fiscal measures as a
prerequisite for US$5.5 billion of support. When these measures were
not met, the money was withheld, because "the managing director [of the
IMF] ... was determined to show that the Fund was serious about its
conditionality in a situation where determined action by the authorities
was absolutely essential to restore market [creditor] confidence., 227 He
also notes that the trend away from large IMF bailout packages to "more
consistent efforts to involve private creditors in the resolution of
223. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 57.
224. Leite, supra note 177, at 46.
225. STIGLITZ, supra note 177, at 203.
226. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 57 (emphasis added); see also id. at 27 ("[Tlhe government
needed to demonstrate its capacity to restrain its appetite for public borrowing to within rea-
sonable limits before international credit markets would willingly take on additional
exposure."). He notes particularly that if creditors lose enough confidence as to pursue legal
actions for collection, "Argentina would be precluded from access to international credit mar-
kets for a protracted period." Id. at 29-30; see also id. at 65 ("When the economic situation
does stabilize and the Argentine economy moves forward into recovery ... the international
community will still have considerable leverage over the Argentine authorities; and, if neces-
sary, it should be prepared to use this leverage to help assure than [sic] external claimants on
Argentina are treated fairly.").
227. Id. at 43.
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financial crises" increases even further the importance of creditor
confidence.22 In fact, it is his view that, if only the Argentine government
had implemented even tougher austerity measures to boost creditor
confidence in late 2000, the disaster could have been avoided. 29 He
concludes with an outright declaration of the problematic double role of
the IMF which this Note brings to light, dubbing it the tension of the
IMF as "a sympathetic social worker and as a tough cop," arguing that
the "tough cop" approach of SAPs is "consistent with-indeed, it is
required by-the Fund's fundamental responsibility to provide assistance
to its members while simultaneously supporting the principles of a stable
and efficient international financial system and safeguarding the
temporary revolving character of its own resources. 23°
E. The Other Contract: The Social Contract
The presumption of structural adjustment is that there are only par-
ticular economically austere policies that will lead to growth and make a
creditor confident.23' Because these policies are generally at odds with
the right of a people to dispose of their natural wealth and resources (as
shown in the Argentine case in the previous four Subsections), this pre-
sumption violates ICESCR article 1(2).232 The following Section first
refutes the assumption that the IMF has never suppressed proposed or
attempted alternative Argentine policies that were consistent with the
ICESCR, then begins to examine the dynamic operating between the
228. Id. at 36.
229. Id. at 33.
230. Id. at 65-67.
231. Leite, supra note 177, at 46 ("It is sometimes said that IMF conditionality runs
counter to countries' education, health, or poverty alleviation goals. Conditions may entail, for
example, the privatization of basic services-such as water and electricity-which some
believe could endanger the provision of these services to vulnerable groups. The merits of
such measures need to be debated, with responses tailored to each country. Because many
State-owned utilities had an unbroken record of poor service and high cost to the taxpayer, the
alternative of using private but properly regulated companies cannot be excluded from
consideration"). The question remains: If "private but properly regulated companies" are
possible, why not "public but properly regulated?" Leite seems to mix the issue of
private/public with that of poorly/properly regulated. By switching to private companies
instead of attempting a properly regulated public system, the poor are likely to receive fewer
services, since the company has no obligation to them in the same way a public service does.
Compare STIGLITZ, supra note 177, at 222 ("Markets cannot be relied upon to produce goods
that are essentially public in nature, like defense. In some areas, markets fail to exist;
governments have provided student loans, for instance, because the market, on its own, failed
to provide funding for investments in human capital. And for a wide variety of reasons,
markets are often not self-regulating-there are booms and busts-so the government has an
important role in promoting economic stability... ).
232. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 1(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
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IMF, the borrowing country, and the citizen, proposing that it represents
a unique human rights paradigm.
In his general discussion of IMF policy and alternatives, Joseph
Stiglitz reminds the international community that in addition to the con-
tract a country enters into with its creditors such as the IMF, "there is
another, equally important, unwritten contract, that between citizens and
their society and government, what is sometimes called 'the social con-
tract.' ,,233 This Section examines the social contract in the Argentine case
through the dialogue between Argentina and the ESCR Committee, in
order to question how these two equally important contracts can coexist.
Argentina ratified the ICESCR on August 8, 1986, its first periodic
report was examined in 1994, and its second in 1999.34 In response to a
battery of questions from the ESCR Committee in its 1999 review of
Argentina, about topics as varied as indigenous rights and discrimina-
tion, but including structural adjustment, the first response of the
Argentine delegate exhibited Argentina's concerns about the negative
effects of structural adjustment:
[My] Government, like so many others, was trying to adapt to
the current global situation and open up the country's economy,
which it could not do without loans. The international financial
institutions, such as the IMF, imposed certain conditions on the
country when loans were being negotiated, especially in the
fields of employment and social security. It would therefore be
helpful if the Committee would share its criticisms, suggestions
and concerns not only with delegations, but with institutions like
the IMF as well.235
Similarly, in response to intense criticisms over labor standards in re-
lation to articles 6, 7, and 8 of the ICESCR, the Argentine delegation had
this to say:
Since labour flexibility was one of the conditionalities imposed
on the Government by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the Committee might wish to inform IMF of its concerns in that
233. STIGLITz, supra note 177, at 209 ("This contract requires the provision of basic
social and economic protections, including reasonable opportunities for employment. While
misguidingly working to preserve what it saw as the sanctity of the credit contract, the IMF
was willing to tear apart the even more important social contract."); see also id. at 240 ("There
needs to be a restoration of balance: the concerns of workers and small businesses have to be
balanced with the concerns of creditors.").
234. Treaty Ratification Status, supra note 34; Summary Record of the 31st Meeting,
U.N. ESCOR, 11 th Sess., 31st mtg., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/SR.31 (1994); Summary Record
of the 33rd Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, 21st Sess., 33d mtg., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/SR.33
(1999).
235. U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/SR.33, supra note 234, 913-23.
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regard. Macroeconomic considerations must not be the sole cri-
terion; the social sector's voice should also be heard....
Argentina was unique in Latin America for the size of its middle
class, whose shrinking earning power stemmed from the aboli-
tion of posts in public services and the public utilities. The
advent of the structural adjustment process had precluded full
employment and adequate salaries.236
The ESCR Committee similarly expressed concern about SAPs in the
Argentine context. In its concluding observations, the sole comment given
by the ESCR Committee under its section on "factors and difficulties im-
peding the implementation of the Covenant" was: "The Committee
acknowledges the financial difficulties encountered by the Argentine
economy in the last four years. While the Government has succeeded in
stabilizing the value of the currency, the implementation of the structural
adjustment programme has hampered the enjoyment of economic, social
and cultural rights, in particular by the disadvantaged groups in soci-
ety.,
237
This is an outright acknowledgement by the Committee that
structural adjustment has hindered the realization of ESC rights in
Argentina, consistent with Argentina's official comments to that body.
The Committee goes on to recommend "that the State party, when
negotiating with international financial institutions, take into account its
Covenant obligations to respect, protect and fulfil all of the rights
enshrined in the Covenant., 238 Certainly, the nation-state has primary
responsibility for preventing human rights abuses of its citizens in which
it might be involved.239 Indeed, the original model of human rights is one
of insuring that citizens of any particular country are protected from their
own government. The conundrum of structural adjustment is that the
nation-state is a captive in its own right. The question is one of
bargaining power, and the sequence looks like this:
1) Argentina attempts to meet the obligations it has to its citi-
zens under the ICESCR.
236. Summary Record of the Second Part (Public) of the 34th Meeting, U.N. ESCOR,
21 st Sess., 34th mtg., at T 32, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/1999/SR.34/Add. I (1999).
237. U.N. ESCOR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, at 10, U.N. DOC. E/C. 12/I/Add.38 (1999).
238. Id. [28.
239. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 50 ("States have traditionally been seen as the primary
obligation-subjects in relation to human rights. The origin of human rights is to be found in an
attempt to limit the scope of action of a government-to set certain limits as to what a gov-
emnment could do to its citizens .. "); BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 93.
240. See supra note 32.
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2) To do that, the government needs two things, policies and
money.
3) The Argentine government attempts to choose policies consis-
tent with the Covenant and borrow the money from the IME
4) The IMF refuses to loan the money unless Argentina adopts
the IMF's policies over its own. Such policies, including the
zero-deficit law, cuts to social security, and provincial cuts are
inconsistent with Argentina's obligations under the ICESCR.
5) The IMF has superior bargaining power, being the LLR.
6) Because of this superior bargaining power of the IMF, Argen-
tina is forced to accept the terms that violate the ICESCR.
If Argentina had never attempted to choose policies consistent with
ESC rights and thus step three never actually occurred, the causal link to
the IMF would be lost. However, Argentine governments have attempted
on several occasions to enact policies consistent with the ICESCR while
negotiating with the IMF, and funds have been consistently denied until
these policies were changed. For example, ex-President Arturo Illia, who
came to power in 1963 at a time of very high unemployment, budget
deficit, foreign debt, and high inflation, attempted a nationalist-reformist
strategy consistent with ESC rights.14 ' He called for government support
of domestically owned industries, a proactive "affirmative action" inter-
pretation of article 2(2)'s freedom from economic discrimination, since
foreign firms are likely to be at a strong advantage in a flailing economy
by profiting on exchange rates and price of local labor, and such firms
are much less likely to keep profits in the country. He also called for
price controls, attempting to uphold the article 11 right to an adequate
standard of living and freedom from hunger in a time when prices on
basic staples risked spiraling out of control; and wage increases, attempt-
ing to stimulate the economy in a manner consistent with the article 7
right of a fair wage and a decent living for work.242 The result: Interna-
tional loans to Argentina fell from a high of US$361 million to US$6
million in two years time.243 It was not until his successor Colonel Juan
Ongania agreed to reverse these policies that the doors to the IMF and
other IFIs swung back open for Argentina.2"
Second, the IMF refused loans to Isabel Peron's government in 1974
because of her policies of government social spending and wage in-
241. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 59, at 234.
242. Id.; ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 7, 993 U.N.T.S. at 6.
243. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 59, at 234.
244. Id. at 234-35.
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creases.2 Third, Alfonsin's 1983 government faced a similar fate when it
refused to use US$1 billion in foreign exchange on debt servicing, insist-
ing on using the money for development instead, and announcing plans
to increase expenditures for housing, consistent with article 11; health,
consistent with article 12; and education, consistent with article 13;
while reducing military spending. 6 His Finance Minister Grinspun an-
nounced, "We will not make any agreement with the IMF if this in any
way limits the growth of the Argentinean economy."2 47 Argentina held out
for several months, but it proved impossible to negotiate with the IMF on
such terms. In September 1984, Argentina was forced to accept a tradi-
tional IMF austerity package to qualify for standby credits and debt
rescheduling. The terms of the austerity package included a reduction of
public expenditures and deferral of wage increases. 8
Finally, in the current crisis, the IMF and Argentina spent the year
2002 in constant deadlock over competing goals of fiscal austerity and
social spending. On September 24, 2002, Economy Minister Roberto
Lavagna said that the Duhalde government would not abandon its policy
of social assistance even if it meant further delays to IMF support.249
Specifically, Minister Lavagna stated that "[t]here are two priorities
which we will not abandon[:] We will maintain social programs and
ensure the financing of provincial economies.,,25° According to the
Argentine government, IMF negotiators were demanding more spending
cuts and an end to court rulings against the corallito. Alfredo Atanasof,
President Duhalde's Cabinet Chief, said, "It seems ill advised to me that
the fund has expressed its opinion about social plans. K6hler and
Krueger [Managing Director and First Deputy Director of the IMF]
ought to know that if the enormous network of social containment
wasn't working, this country would have gone up in flames., 25 These
events thus represent the last and perhaps most poignant example of
Argentina's attempts to meet its Covenant obligations being blocked by
the IMF's requirements to borrow resources.252 When the negotiations
245. Id. at 236.
246. Id. at 241; ICESCR, supra note 8, arts. 11-13, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7-8.
247. Marlise Simons, Argentina Repayment Is Doubted, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 27, 1984, at
D23.
248. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 59, at 242.
249. Larry Rohter, Argentina Says It Will Skip International Loan Payment, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2002, at W 1.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See also Argentina's Collapse: The Death of Peronism?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16,
2002, at 31 (noting that part of the delay in approval of a new agreement between the IMF and
Argentina "is said to be due to the IMF's ... queasiness that any deal might boost Mr. Du-
halde, thus prolonging a government which has lacked the strength and will to take tough
decisions").
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finally did come to an end with the signing of a new Letter of Intent on
January 24, 2003,3' President Duhalde, marked the occasion with
adamant criticism of IFIs. Speaking three days after the agreement at the
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, President Duhalde used
his only official intervention to accuse the IFIs of operating on a "double
standard" unfavorable to developing countries, arguing that international
organizations are creating policy through structural adjustment to
controvert the will of developing-country leaders such as himself.
254
As these four examples show, policy alternatives consistent with
ESC rights have been suppressed by SAPs on several occasions. 5 Be-
cause they were suppressed, we do not know whether such policies
would have been effective. The historically prevailing ideology at the
IMF, which has forced Argentina to abandon such policies, is that such
policies would not be effective. Although there is a growing dialogue-
not only by protesters,256 but also among winners of the Nobel Prize in
Economics,257 within other U.N. Agencies,258 and even in limited cases at
253. Finalmente, Ayer se Firm6 el Acuerdo con el FMI, supra note 93.
254. Duhalde Cuestion6 al FMI y Provoc6 un Duro Debate, LA NACION, Jan. 27, 2003,
available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar. President Duhalde's critiques of IFIs, which
continued for ten minutes, were opposed only by financier George Soros, who places all
blame for the Argentine crisis squarely on prior mismanagement by the Argentine government.
President Duhalde's comments were supported by all remaining speakers, including Phil
Gramm, Vice President of the World Financial Group UBS Warburg (and ex-United States
Senator); Trevor Manuel, Minister of Finance of South Africa; Rajat Gupta, Executive
Director of McKinsey and Company; and Hernando de Soto, President of the Institute of
Liberty and Democracy and author of THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000). Despite his
criticisms of IFIs, Duhalde nevertheless guarded stubborn confidence for the future: Asked by
Kenneth Rogoff, Chief Economist and Director of Research at the IMF, what title he would
give to a book about Argentina and the IMF written ten years from now, President Duhalde
responded "Argentina, From Disaster to Success."
255. Compare Leite, supra note 177, at 44 ("[T]he IMF encourages governments to do
everything within their power to protect social expenditures, [and] this advice is generally
being followed") with STIGLITZ, supra note 177, at 209-10 ("[A]fter the billions are spent to
maintain the exchange rate at an unsustainable level and to bail out the foreign creditors, after
their governments have knuckled under to the pressure of the IMF to cut back on expendi-
tures, so that the countries face a recession in which millions of workers lose their jobs, there
seems to be no money around when it comes to finding the far more modest sums to pay sub-
sidies for food or fuel for the poor."). Yet, even Leite, writing in the IMF's own publication on
the IMF, admits that "[a]djustment efforts create winners and losers, and sometimes the poor
suffer disproportionately. In those cases, it may be necessary to introduce appropriate safety
nets to help alleviate adverse social consequences. The IMF seeks to remain open to criticism
and to change its policies when results are disappointing." Leite, supra note 177, at 44.
256. See Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network, supra note
3.
257. STIGLiTZ, supra note 177, at 241 ("It is possible to promote equality and rapid
growth at the same time; in fact, more egalitarian policies appear to help growth....").
258. Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Richard Jolly, & Frances Stewart, An Overview of the
Alternative Approach, in ADJUSTMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE 131, 131-46 (Giovanni Andrea
Cornia, Richard Jolly, & Frances Stewart eds., 1987) (advocating macro policies which are
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the IMF259-that policies emphasizing social services would promote
growth, this Note does not follow that line exactly. Rather, it acknowl-
edges that the IMF is beholden to the confidence of private creditors and
that the private creditors will demand market led reforms. This assump-
tion creates a unique human rights paradigm, in which the IMF is
necessary to States for them to meet their ICESCR obligations by pro-
viding resources, but simultaneously imposes SAPs that, as in the
Argentine case, can violate ESC rights.
IV. THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PARADIGM
International human rights law traditionally emerged from the
international law of nations because it provided rights to individuals
against their government, as compared to traditional international law
which resolved disputes between nations.26 It should be clear by this
point that, although the State always retains a role of primary
responsibility in human rights abuses of its own citizens, structural
adjustment presents a unique human rights model, in which it would be
unjust and ineffective to hold the State solely responsible because of its
unequal bargaining power in relation to IFIs.26' Thus, whereas traditional
international law addresses the relationship between nations, and human
rights law addresses the relationship between citizens and their nation,
the structural adjustment paradigm addresses the relationship between a
nation representing its citizens and intergovernmental agencies
themselves such as the IMF.
262
Because ICESCR article 2(1) limits the responsibility of a State
Party in fulfilling the provisions of the Covenant to "the maximum of its
available resources," the argument could be made that a case of severe
economic distress such as that experienced by Argentina simply
more expansive and gradual, a focus on basic services, and compensatory programs to protect
basic living standards, monitoring of health, and nutrition).
259. Leite, supra note 177, at 46 (noting that recently, several countries' structural ad-
justment programs-most notably Burkina Faso, Nicaragua, and Rwanda-have included new
efforts to incorporate human rights, including a stronger emphasis on access to education,
health care, and food security).
260. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 50; see also BEDERMAN, supra note 7, at 93.
261. See Paul, supra note 33, at 310 (arguing that the international law of development
"can be seen as a species of public international law because it speaks primarily to states and
intergovernmental organizations") (emphasis added).
262. See generally Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights 2 (Maastricht, Jan. 22-26, 1997), at http://www l.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
Maastrichtguidelines_.html [hereinafter Maastricht Guidelines] ("It is no longer taken for
granted that the realization of economic, social and cultural rights depends significantly on
action by the state, although, as a matter of international law, the state remains ultimately
responsible for guaranteeing the realization of these rights.").
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necessitates a lessening of Covenant obligations on the State Party. 263 The
problem with this argument is that it ignores the new human rights
paradigm that structural adjustment presents: It is true that article 2(1)
attaches the duty to realize the ICESCR to the maximum of its available
resources on the State Party.26 But, this does not speak to the duty of IFIs
and structural adjustment policy. The State Party, in fact, is trying to
meet its ICESCR obligations, through borrowing money, presumably in
an honest attempt to provide services to its citizens consistent with the
Covenant. The structural adjustment paradigm is concerned with the
IMF's duty not to prevent the State Party from meeting its Covenant
obligations, rather than the State Party's duty to meet those obligations.
The structural adjustment paradigm presumes that the State Party, if
allowed, will meet its Covenant obligations, but is prevented from doing
so by the SAP. The "to the maximum of its available resources" clause
thus does not apply, because that clause concerns the State Party's duty,
which we presume it will meet if its free will is not constrained by the
SAP.
265
Under the structural adjustment paradigm, a number of realities are
accepted:
* States will occasionally become so want for resources that
they cannot meet their ICESCR obligations;
* IFIs help States to meet their ICESCR obligations by loaning
them money; and
263. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 2(l), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5; see SKOGLY, supra note 7, at
127; General Comment No. 3, supra note 118, arts. 1, 9-11.
264. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 50.
265. Another argument that surfaces is that the "real problem" is wasteful spending by
corrupt leaders. This argument focuses the attention away from any change the SAP has on
ESC rights and instead focuses on a few prominent examples of massive wasteful spending by
dictators like Amin, Marcos, or Bokassa. This Note acknowledges that many IMF dollars have
been wasted or hoarded by corrupt governments, but from this it does not follow that every
government is corrupt. The question of corruption is for a different paper, because these cases
are outside the structural adjustment paradigm. The structural adjustment paradigm is con-
cerned, rather, with cases where a government has attempted to act in the interest of its
people's ESC rights, but was prevented from doing so. Overall, it is my contention that the
structural adjustment paradigm is present far more often than the corruption paradigm. It is
important to acknowledge the possibility of corruption, but trying to focus all the attention on
the concern for corruption, ignoring even the possibility of the structural adjustment paradigm
where the government is acting in the people's best interest, is paternalistic on the part of
commentators analyzing IFIs, and borders on neocolonialism in its perceived need to control
developing world governments.
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* Under existing macroeconomic theory, the IFIs will legiti-
mately impose conditionalities in order to gain enough
creditor confidence to support private loans to the State.266
All three of these realities have been debated by commentators in the
past, but the structural adjustment paradigm assumes that they are true
and focuses on the result: Because an IFI's complicity in the human
rights situation of the State is reciprocal, effective monitoring of the
State's human rights practices is possible only through effective monitor-
267ing of the IFI's practices.
This inevitable tension between macroeconomic reforms and human
rights was also noted by the Banque Paribas Conjoncture:
By imposing adherence to another IMF program as a condition
for more aid, the international community is pursuing a laisser-
faire strategy regarding this crisis. Argentina requires the help of
an international LLR, i.e. a quasiunconditional injection of cash
to stop the hemorrhaging of capital. The problem of sharing the
burden of asset losses, on the other hand, is an issue that calls for
an unprecedented international political choice. The IMF is not
adapted to resolving these two distinct problems.268
This passage recognizes the structural adjustment paradigm, but stops
short of a solution, adding that the IMF is not well-adapted to offer one.
The next Part attempts to carry forward the debate, analyzing what level
of external human rights monitoring of the IMF is legally possible,
concluding with an analysis of what kind of monitoring is practically
desirable.
266. See Statement of the Representative of the IMF to the Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 43d Sess., 7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/63 (1991) ("[Tlhere appears to be relatively widespread agreement as to
the necessity for adjustment, and ... without adjustment the economic condition of many
countries might have become even worse... ), quoted in SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 41. But
see Martin Feldstein, Argentina Doesn't Need the IMF, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2002, at A18
(arguing that Argentina could and should build its economy without the help of another IMF
loan).
267. The IFI's complicity in a State's human rights obligations is reciprocal because the
IFI helps the State to fulfill its human rights obligations through providing "available re-
sources," yet imposes conditionalities which are in some cases contrary to human rights.
268. Argentina: One Year of Solitude, supra note 105, 5.
Winter 20031
Michigan Journal of International Law
V. ADDRESSING THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PARADIGM
A. The Position of the IMF in International
Human Rights Law
In order to examine whether the structural adjustment paradigm can
be addressed by international human rights law, the IMF's relationship to
international human rights law must first be established. This is a two-
part analysis. First, on the most general level, there is a longstanding
debate over the international legal personality of all international organi-
zations. 69 International legal personality is "the quality of being an
international person., 270 Amidst two extremes-one arguing that interna-
tional organizations have no legal personality at all, and another
advocating a legal personality of international organizations equivalent
to that of States-most commentators have settled in a middle ground,
by which international organizations have some international legal per-
sonality determined primarily by their constituent instruments. 27' A
269. This debate goes back at least to 1949, when the ICJ decided Reparations for Inju-
ries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (1949).
270. ARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (1995). Tunkin defined full legal personality
of States as including the following characteristics: 1) Rights and duties under international
law; 2) Sovereignty, which means supreme power over States' respective territories and popu-
lation; 3) Sovereign equality of all States; 4) Privileges and immunities of States and their
organs; 5) The capacity to participate in the process of creating norms of international law; 6)
The capacity to participate in international legal relations; 7) The capacity to bring interna-
tional claims; 8) The capacity to take enforcement actions under international law; and 9) The
capacity to bear international responsibility. Grigory Tunkin, International Law in the Interna-
tional System, 147 RECEUIL DES COURS 1, 201-02 (1975). International organizations cannot
achieve full international legal personality of States because they lack territory. Enrique J.
Aramburu, Responsabilidad de los Organismos Internacionales y Jurisprudencia Argentina,
[2000-II] J.A. 1115, 1116. Thus, a relaxed test has developed with respect to international
organizations which requires "the possession of international rights and duties," the capacity
to create such rights and obligations, and the ability to demand recognition of such rights in
the international forum. BROCHES, supra, at 15; see also Aramburu, supra, at 1115-16 (formu-
lating a four part test including I) the ability to make international claims, 2) the ability to
enter into treaties, 3) the right to exercise diplomatic protection in some cases, and 4) the ac-
tive and passive right of legation). In terms of the subject matter of this Note, Aramburu's
contribution is also noteworthy because it analyzes the few times that Argentine courts have
treated the question of the legal personality of international organizations, argues the treatment
has been insufficient, and calls for a national law regulating this matter. Id. at 1117-19.
271. Tunkin, supra note 270, at 198-201; see also P.K. MENON, THE LAW OF TREATIES
BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 17-25 (1992) (outlining a similar
history with respect to the treaty-making power of international organizations). The limits of
this treaty-making power have been codified by the United Nations in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between Interna-
tional Organizations, UNGOR, UN Doc. A/CONF.129/15 (Mar. 20, 1986) [hereinafter
VCLTIO], reproduced in MENON, supra, at 159-245; see also Reparations for Injuries Suf-
fered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. at 180 ("Whereas a State possesses the
totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law, the rights and duties
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review of the IMF Articles of Agreement suggests that the IMF has such
legal personality. 272 Furthermore, it is significantly easier to justify hu-
man rights duties for the IMF under its Articles of Agreement than for
the World Bank under its corresponding Articles of Agreement: Whereas
the World Bank is explicitly prohibited from interfering in the domestic
affairs of its members including human rights, the IMF has no equivalent
"prohibition of domestic affairs" provision in its Articles of Agree-
ment.273
of... [an international organization] must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified
or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice... "); MENON, supra, at
202-03; Aramburu, supra note 270, at 1116-17.
272. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 68-70 (analyzing the Articles of Agreement and conclud-
ing that they "clearly assume a personality for the IMF separate from that of the members,
giving the IMF both a municipal and an international legal personality").
273. Articles of Agreement of the World Bank, Dec. 27, 1945, art. IV, § 5. But, even in
the case of the World Bank, there is a growing number of commentators who argue that, by
virtue of the fact that human rights are enshrined in the U.N. Charter, they can no longer be
considered purely domestic political affairs. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 96-97 (citing, among
others, HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 213-14 (1950)
(arguing that human rights are an issue of international and not domestic concern by virtue of
their codification in the U.N. Charter as one of the main purposes of the United Nations); A.A
Canqado Trindade, The Domestic Jurisdiction of States in the Practice of the United Nations
and Regional Organisations, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 715, 736-37 (1976) (describing a
unanimous vote of the Security Council in 1960 for a Resolution calling for the end of the sale
of equipment for arms manufacture in South Africa, against that State's contention that
consideration of the issue by the Security Council violated its domestic affairs)). Skogly notes
that "If human rights issues were seen to fall solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the
Member States, because it concerns matters between the individual and his/her government,
and therefore is covered by [article] 2(7), it would basically render [article] 1(3) worthless."
Id. at 97. Indeed, even the World Bank has acknowledged that it "must consider ... economic
effects together with all other relevant economic factors, in the light of the purposes of the
Organisation. What [the Bank] is precluded from considering is the political character of a
member as an independent criterion for a decision." Id. at 98 (citing Memorandum of the
Legal Department of the IBRD, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Annex 2, Agenda Item 66, at 9, U.N.
Doc. A/6825 (1967)). Thus, even with a "prohibition of domestic affairs" provision, it is not at
all clear that the Bank lacks human rights duties. The domestic affairs limitation is also
illogical within the framework of the structural adjustment paradigm. As stated above, under
the structural adjustment paradigm it is presumed that a State has intentions of meeting its
ICESCR obligations, but has so few resources to do so (a requirement for "bail out" structural
adjustment lending) that it is dependent on the World Bank to gain the resources so that it can
meet its obligations. In the case where the World Bank loans money without conditionality, no
human rights duties would become shared by the State and the World Bank. But, in the
structural adjustment paradigm, conditionalities are imposed. Thus, at the same time that the
World Bank is helping the State to meet its ICESCR obligations by lending the money, it is
imposing conditionalities that may limit the State's ability to meet its Covenant obligations. In
other words, it is giving with one hand and taking away with the other. This being the case, it
is nonsensical to say that the World Bank's human rights obligations are limited because it is
prohibited from interfering in the political affairs of a Member State, since the conditionality
is itself the biggest interference of all: To the extent that the SAP is contrary to human rights
norms, the principle of noninterference is a reason why the World Bank should be held
accountable under human rights law, not a reason why it should not. If a State is obligated to
accept a SAP in order to acquire resources to meet its Covenant obligations, and the SAP will
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Second, questions are also raised with regard to the IMF as a
specialized agency of the United Nations. In her comprehensive analysis
of the human rights obligations of IFIs, Professor Sigrun Skogly notes
that although
[t]he literature contains little analysis as to the difference it
makes, in terms of law, whether an organization is a specialized
agency or not[, o]ne would ... assume that part of the reasoning
behind bringing these organizations into a formalized relation-
ship with the UN must have been to grant them, both legally and
practically, rights and obligations in relationship to the UN,
which would have been different if they were not brought into
this relationship through [the Relationship] Agreements. 274
By this reasoning, one should be less hesitant to attach human rights du-
ties to the IMF, as a specialized agency of the U.N., than another
organization that is not a specialized agency.275 Article 22 of the ICESCR
also includes specialized agencies:
The Economic and Social Council may bring to the attention of
other organs of the United Nations, their subsidiary organs and
specialized agencies concerned with furnishing technical
assistance any matters arising out of the reports referred to in
this part of the present Covenant which may assist such bodies
in deciding, each within its field of competence, on the
cause the State to violate human rights, then the World Bank should be prevented from
imposing this SAP because it will interfere in the State's domestic political affairs (its human
rights obligations). See also Nanda, supra note 37, at 55 (explaining that the interference in
domestic affairs "argument ignores the fact that international human rights law should be
observed by all states and thus observance of this same law by international agencies could
not cause a political interference"); SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 97-98; id. at 94-97 (noting IMF
claims that a "domestic affairs" provision is implied by U.N. Charter article 2(7), and refuting
these claims based on several cases of the International Court of Justice). On the inclusion of
human rights within the scope of "domestic affairs," see SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 94-95.
274. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 100 (citing THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 799 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994) ("[B]efore the beginning of a relationship
(through an agreement) a specialized agency does not yet have rights and duties of its own
towards the UN")); see also Nanda, supra note 37, at 55-57 (arguing for human rights duties
of IFIs based on articles 57 and 63 of the U.N. Charter and the agencies' Articles of Agree-
ment).
275. See also Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and
Egypt, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 89-90 (1980), cited in SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 70 (holding with re-
spect to the World Health Organization that "[i]nternational organizations are bound by any
obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their
constitutions, or under international agreements to which they are parties").
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advisability of international measures likely to contribute to the
. .276
effective progressive implementation of the present Covenant.
In its General Comment No. 2 on article 22, the ESCR Committee
states that "[r]ecommendations in accordance with article 22 may be
made to ... the World Bank and the IMF. '277 Although this general
comment clearly establishes, from the ESCR Committee's point of view,
the legitimacy of a human rights dialogue between the Committee and
the IMF, such human rights recommendations do not necessarily imply
human rights duties, since the IMF is not a party to the ICESCR and
cannot become one. 27' The duties of third-party international organiza-
tions to treaties is codified in article 35 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Be-
tween International Organizations (VCLTIO):
An obligation arises for a third State or a third organization from
a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provi-
sion to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third
State or the third organization expressly accepts that obligation
in writing. Acceptance by the third organization of such an obli-
gation shall be governed by the rules of the organization.279
Although some commentators argue that this prevents the ICESCR from
creating human rights duties for the IMF absent express consent by the
IMF, a minority argue that the very fact that the IMF cannot ratify the
Covenant, which is limited to States, makes this passage inapplicable.8
In general, it is unlikely that, in light of this article, the IMF can be
directly bound by the ICESCR.2 ' However, the IMF is bound by the
276. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 22, 993 U.N.T.S. at 10.
277. General Comment No. 2, supra note 53, 2.
278. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 130 ("The Bank and the Fund have not ratified [and can-
not ratify] the Covenant, and are consequently not parties to it").
279. VCLTIO, supra note 27 1, art. 35, reproduced in MENON, supra note 27 1, at 195.
280. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 83-84 (establishing the dispute between commentators)
Skogly concludes:
Thus, even though it has been established that draft treaty law precludes obligations
for third parties unless they have explicitly accepted such obligation, there is a theo-
retical possibility that treaty law may bind organizations without their consent. It
could be argued that the draft treaty law is aimed at treaties to which the interna-
tional organizations are able to accede, and not to all treaties.
Id.
281. Skogly also argues that because the majority of IMF member nations are parties to
the Covenant, the IMF would have some duty to respect it. Id. at 134-36. This assertion is of
questionable merit because, as Skogly herself admits, the IMF has its own international legal
personality, a veil that the human rights duties of its members would not pierce. Skogly
acknowledges this to a point, stating that the obligation to respect members' human rights
duties is not as strong in relationship to the ICESCR as to the U.N. Charter. Id. at 135. But, as
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U.N. Charter, which also contains human rights provisions relating to
economic, social, and cultural rights."' These Charter provisions are
hierarchically superior and therefore control the agreements between the
IMF and borrowing nations, such as the LOI/MOU at issue in this
Note." 3 As a means of elaborating and explaining the human rights
provisions of the Charter, the ICESCR can indirectly be applied to the
IMF.254 Finally, the IMF is bound by customary international human
rights law, which applies to all actors with international legal
personality.285
B. The Obligation to "Respect, Protect, and Fulfill" in
the Structural Adjustment Paradigm
The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has, in its
General Comment No. 12 on the Right to Food, clearly outlined the ex-
tent of ESC duties on States Parties:
explained below, the IMF as an international legal actor has a duty to respect the U.N. Charter
independent of the duties of its constituent members.
282. Id. at 101 ("[S]pecialized agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF are legally
obligated not to conduct actions contravening the principles and purposes of the UN Charter,
and also to respect the Charter, including the human rights provisions"); U.N. CHARTER art. 1,
para. 3 (establishing human rights as one of the fundamental purposes of the U.N., with spe-
cific reference to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), available at http://www.un.org/
aboutun/charter/index.html; U.N. CHARTER art. 55 (establishing U.N. promotion of human
rights as necessary for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being); U.N. CHARTER
art. 62 (granting power to the Economic and Social Council to advise specialized agencies
(such as the IMF) on economic, social, and cultural matters); see also ICESCR, supra note 8,
art. 22, 993 U.N.T.S. at 10.
283. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter states that "In the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obliga-
tions under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail." The International Law Commission has concluded that this also applies in the case of
treaties between international organizations and States. Summary Records of the 1438th meet-
ing of the International Law Commission, June 10, 1977, 1977-I YB. ILC 120, para. 2, cited
in SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 102.
284. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 136 ("[Tihe application of the Covenant brings more clar-
ity to the substantive content of the human rights standards, which the [IMF has an] ...
obligation not to violate ... according to ... the Charter.....).
285. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW As CUSTOMARY LAW
3 (1989), cited in SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 113; see also VCLTIO, supra note 271, art. 43
(stating that the "invalidity, termination, or denunciation of a treaty" by a State or international
organization does not affect its duty to observe customary international law). Although some
commentators argue that the entire UDHR is customary international law, many commentators
agree that ESC rights are generally not among the human rights norms with status as custom-
ary international law. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 121-22. Some commentators have also
attempted to attach human rights liability to IFls because of their nature as bodies composed
of nations with human rights obligations. See Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 262, 19;
SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 106-08.
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The right to adequate food, like any other human right, imposes
three types or levels of obligations on States parties: the obliga-
tions to respect, to protect and to fulfil. In turn, the obligation to
fulfil incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an obliga-
tion to provide. The obligation to respect existing access to
adequate food requires States parties not to take any measures
that result in preventing such access. The obligation to protect
requires measures by the State to ensure that enterprises or indi-
viduals do not deprive individuals of their access to adequate
food. The obligation to fulfil (facilitate) means the State must
pro-actively engage in activities intended to strengthen people's
access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure their
livelihood, including food security. Finally, whenever an indi-
vidual or group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to
enjoy the right to adequate food by the means at their disposal,
States have the obligation to fulfil (provide) that right directly.
This obligation also applies for persons who are victims of natu-
ral or other disasters."'
Although the Comment relates to the right to food, it clearly states
that its standards are generally applicable, and the tripartite "respect,
protect, and fulfill" language is becoming common parlance among
commentators on ESC rights. 87 The question which needs to be ad-
dressed is how this framework fits into the structural adjustment
paradigm. The structural adjustment paradigm is unique because it as-
sumes that a country is trying to meet its ICESCR obligations by
borrowing money, but the conditionalities on which the very money is
borrowed go against human rights norms. If the IFI were only helping
the State to solve its human rights problem by lending it the "available
resources," then it would not become complicit in the State's human
rights obligations, and the structural adjustment paradigm would not be
created. When the IFI simultaneously solves and creates human rights
problems, however, some level of human rights duties must be shared by
the IFI. Much of the confusion revolves around the correct level of duty
the IFI should assume. A fair amount has been written suggesting that
the IFIs, especially the World Bank, should or at least may have a role in
protecting human rights,288 but that goes too far since "human rights is
286. General Comment No. 12, supra note 166, T 15.
287. See Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 262, TT 6-7 (summarizing the international
law of ESC rights since 1986, and employing the "respect, protect, and fulfill" language).
288. See Leite, supra note 177, at 47 (arguing that "the work of the IMF should not be
seen as a threat to human rights, but as a key contribution. Together, human rights and eco-
nomic development hold the key to a better world for all."); Halim Moris, The World Bank and
Human Rights: Indispensable Partnership or Mismatched Alliance?, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
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not mentioned in the institutions' statutes, and promotion of human
rights will require a much more active human rights policy operation
than the institutions have been set up to handle.8 9 Rather, the human
rights dialogue on IFIs should be limited to human rights compliance
(respect), before questioning human rights promotion (protect, fulfill).
Whereas the State's duty extends from respect to protect to fulfill, the IFI
is under a duty only to respect human rights.290 In other words, SAPs can
be imposed if they respect human rights norms. By providing the avail-
able resources, they will help States to protect and fulfill, but the SAP is
not under an obligation to do so.' 9'
C. A Solution in Game Theory?
The structural adjustment paradigm brings to light the possibility
that human rights advocates are loathe to accept: SAPs are unavoidable,
but there may be cases in which no foreseeable SAP can be designed
which would completely respect human rights. Assuming that the IMF is
the last resort for the borrowing State, then denial of the structural ad-
justment loan could mean even greater threats to human rights through
lack of resources in the future, or at time 2 (T2) than the human rights
concerns inherent in the loan itself through conditionality in the present,
or at time I (TI). 292 Both the State Party and the IMF have an obligation
to respect human rights at all times.293 In a case of economic hardship
necessitating a structural adjustment loan,294 this would mean attempting
to respect human rights in the future, at T2, by taking out a structural
adjustment loan in the present, at TI. As the Argentine case shows, it
L. 173 (1997) (setting out arguments for and against an active World Bank role in human
rights, and concluding that such a role is desirable and could be legal with changes to its
Articles of Agreement); Bradlow, supra note 12, at 50-52 (Claiming that human rights and the
economic functions of the IFIs are "inherently intertwined," and therefore urging IFIs to better
define their human rights policy, so that their impact can be a positive one).
289. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 151.
290. Id. at 135-36, 151-52.
291. Another way of framing this same issue is employed by the Maastricht Guidelines,
supra note 262, $ 7, which set up a dichotomy between "obligations of conduct" (equivalent to
obligations to protect and fulfill) and "obligations of result" (equivalent to obligations to re-
spect). Under this terminology, IMF human rights obligations are obligations of result.
SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 162 (noting that the "absence of specific requirements of implemen-
tation procedures is a common characteristic of international law. International law will often
leave the specific implementation decisions to States or other legal subjects without dictating
in detail how it is to be done. This does not imply that obligations are lacking... ).
292. Alexander, supra note 1, at 173 (noting that the "critique of adjustment does not
imply that the condition of the poor would necessarily improve without adjustment").
293. For an explanation of why the IMF has an obligation to protect human rights, see
supra Section V(A). See also SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 93-109, 162.
294. If a solution to the economic hardship that does not involve structural adjustment is
foreseeable, then the structural adjustment paradigm is not present.
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may not be possible to design a SAP which both assures creditor confi-
dence and respects human rights. In this case, the best possible
compromise between human rights and creditor confidence at Ti and 72
should be sought, assuring the highest overall human rights compliance
while still achieving a sufficient level of creditor confidence. 295 The dia-
gram in Table I illustrates this interplay:
TABLE I
POSSIBLE OVERALL HUMAN RIGHTS EFFECTS (Ti + T2)
BASED ON VARIOUS COMPROMISES BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS
AND CREDITOR CONFIDENCE AT T1.
Human Rights (T)
Not Considered Considered
A) Unacceptable B) Cannot receive IMF
scenario (neither IMF nor loan at T1 to meet any
Not Considered human rights human rights obligations
mechanisms satisfied at at T2, so overall human
T1) rights compliance low.
C) Some human rights D) Less Human Rights
onde abuses at T1 and T2 abuses at T1, some at
Considered (current model). T2, but cumulatively less
than box C.
As the illustration shows, ignoring both human rights and creditor
confidence is clearly out of the question; this would not address either
macroeconomics or human rights concerns. A plan that ignores macro-
economic factors and favors only human rights-the policy of most of
the NGOs mentioned in Part I of this Note,2 96 is also illegitimate because
the structural adjustment paradigm assumes that a State cannot meet its
ICESCR obligations without borrowing money and that it will not be
295. Perhaps in some countries, an IFI will be able to loan money without requiring
conditionalities that violate the human rights obligations of the borrower at TI (either because
the borrower has few human rights obligations or because the borrower is so situated that few
conditionalities are necessary to gain adequate creditor confidence). In this case, the structural
adjustment paradigm is not present. By definition the structural adjustment paradigm means a
conflict of interests is present, a perfect solution is lacking.
296. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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able to borrow money without sufficient creditor confidence. 2 So in box
B, the State would not be able to get a loan by only considering human
rights without macroeconomic concerns, and failure to secure available
resources would mean failure to meet human rights duties at T2. 98 Such
a complete human rights failure at T2 would mean low overall human
rights compliance.
The third scenario, shown in box C, is the current model, in which
macroeconomic concerns are considered in securing a loan to assure
creditor confidence but human rights at T1 are not considered, either be-
cause they are judged a political and not an economic issue, because they
are judged the internal affairs of a Member State, or for any of the other
reasons that the IMF gives to justify not considering human rights.299 In
box C, human rights at Ti are sacrificed in order to secure a loan to meet
human rights duties at T2. This Note argues for a move from box C to
box D. In box D, human rights and macroeconomic concerns are consid-
ered at T1 in order to secure a loan and meet human rights duties at T2.
It is the contention of this Note that, although it will be impossible to
completely satisfy human rights at Ti while assuring creditor confi-
dence, a best possible compromise between human rights and
macroeconomic concerns at Ti will lead to more human rights being
considered overall than in the current model, represented in box C. This
argument is summarized mathematically in Equation I.
297. The structural adjustment paradigm assumes that creditors will not be sufficiently
confident unless macroeconomic factors are considered. So, under the structural adjustment
paradigm, a State can consider human rights without considering macroeconomic factors if
and only if it does not have to borrow money to consider and meet human rights duties.
298. See F.L. Osunsade, Impacts of Adjustment Programs: Concern for the Human Con-
dition, in WORLD DEBT AND THE HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 1, at 107 (discussing the
"pure human rights" solutions such as those proposed in ADJUSTMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE,
supra note 256, and concluding that "[h[owever legitimate such concerns may be on humani-
tarian or analytical grounds, the logical point of departure should perhaps always be the
fundamental fact that lack of timely action to correct prevailing imbalances and distortions is
likely to do severe and possibly greater damage to economic well-being, especially among the
poor").
299. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 94-98.
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EQUATION I:
C, + C2 > D, + D
(C and D representing human rights abuses in box C and D, with
the subscript indicating whether the abuses were at TI or T2).
Of course, one rarely gets something for nothing, so how could extra
human rights be protected in box D with seemingly no costs? The an-
swer is that there is a cost: Although both human rights and
macroeconomic indicators are considered in box D, just as it is not pos-
sible to protect all human rights, so is it that macroeconomic indicators
may not be as exceptional as in box C. If properly balanced, what is
given up in macroeconomic consideration in box D over box C is more
than made up for in increased human rights protection. The key is to find
the right balance.
An example will help illustrate this point. The different policy
choices and valuations are fictitious; however, the exercise shows that,
whereas some box D scenarios (namely DI) result in a worse overall
score than box C, another combination of compromises between human
rights and macroeconomic concerns might result in a score that is
significantly better than the current model. Assume, as is commonly the
case, that a government is not able to meet its ICESCR obligations in a
number of areas for lack of funds. Without funds from the IMF (and
other donors) the government will not be able to run. Consequently, it
will not be able to provide services, and will violate the ICESCR in
many ways at T2. So, assume it borrows $10 billion from the IMF. This
money is loaned under a structural adjustment plan of fiscal austerity,
programs which save government money but also limit the Covenant
duties the government is able to meet at T1. Assume that these fiscal
austerity measures save the government $3 billion per annum, but limit
the government's ability to provide health care, social security, and
adequate salaries for government employees, ICESCR duties, at a cost of
$3 billion. 300 This would represent the common model, or box C. In this
300. Although it is problematic to quantify loss of human rights, it has been attempted.
See, e.g., Khan, supra note 31, at 101-03 (describing an effort to quantify distributional effects
of structural adjustment in Kenya using multisectoral models based on social accounting ma-
trices).
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example, assume that creditor confidence, if it could be quantified,
would be worth $2 billion.
But, it is important to recognize that many alternative plans exist.3 '
Assume that instead, we move into box D, and human rights advocates
and economics policy makers create an alternate plan. Under this plan,
the government, at the cost of some creditor confidence, only imple-
ments austerity measures of $1 billion. Perhaps it keeps its health care and
cuts social security and government salaries, but not by as much. Assume
that, if creditor confidence in this decreased plan could be quantified it
would be worth $1 billion, and that if the decrease in human rights duties
could be quantified, they would be worth $2 billion. This is summarized in
Table II as box D1. Now, assume the human rights advocates and eco-
nomic policy makers alter the plan, by which social security and health
care are kept intact, government salaries lowered slightly, a temporary tax
on stock transactions is implemented, 02 and regional tariff partners agree
to a tariff on imports."" In this scenario, assume that the stock tax and im-
port tariffs more than make up for the added social security benefits, and
that austerity amounts to $4 billion. Let us quantify creditor confidence at
$1 billion, °" and the decrease in human rights duties at $1 billion. This
scenario appears in Table II as box D2.305
301. Nelson, supra note 222, at 19 ("[T]here is room in most programs for more modest
choices that affect the allocation of costs and burdens in the society. Governments can choose
to raise revenues more and cut expenditures less; impose a surtax on corporate taxes rather
than increase sales taxes; cut military expenditures instead of food subsidies; and raise fees for
university education to help maintain free elementary education. There are also choices re-
garding the degree of reliance on fiscal versus monetary policy .... ); Williamson, supra note
2, at 9 ("The greatest area of flexibility is in the choice of where to direct cuts in public ex-
penditure. For example, the macroeconomic impact will be much the same whether a
reduction in public expenditure is achieved by cutting food subsidies or military spending, but
the distributional impact is quite different."); see also Nanda, supra note 37, at 43 ("It is im-
perative that human rights and the activities of international financial agencies be linked so
that the adjustment policies designed to accomplish debt repayment and economic stabiliza-
tion reflect adequate concern for human rights issues."). It should be noted that this duty to
include human rights concerns is conceptually distinct from the premise that rights-oriented
policies will lead to macroeconomic growth. While in some cases this may be true, in other
cases human rights concerns may slow growth. Regardless of these variations, this Note ar-
gues that human rights concerns must be included, and the best possible compromise between
macroeconomic and human rights concerns must be sought.
302. Such a financial transactions tax was attempted by Domingo Cavallo in Argentina.
MUSSA, supra note 5, at 37.
303. Perhaps the regional partners are surprisingly accepting of this tariff because they
hope it will help solve the country's problems, thereby avoiding contagion problems.
304. Perhaps they are quite concerned by the stock transaction tax, but this is equalized
by their added confidence that austerity is effectuated beyond their hopes.
305. At this point, the careful reader is probably objecting that this hypothetical is only
true as to the fictitious values used, and that different values could be given to create an exam-
ple where box D scored consistently worse than box C. Of course, the same reader would
surely be critical of Ronald Coase: In his seminal article in the Law and Economics move-
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TABLE II
Austerity Creditor Human Total
Confidence Rights
Box C 3 2 -3 2
Box D1 1 1 -2 0
Box D2 4 1 -1 4
Box D3 2 2 -1 3
Perhaps yet another plan could be conceived that resulted in $2 bil-
lion in savings, quantifying creditor confidence at $2 billion, and
limiting human rights by $1 billion. This is summarized in Table II as
box D3. The point is that the ideal plan does not necessarily accentuate
any one of these variables-rather, it is the total result that matters.3
The IMF has acknowledged this point in the Argentine context. Michael
Mussa has stated that although the IMF supported fiscal austerity meas-
ures to reassure creditors, "had the Argentine authorities decided at some
time during 2000-01 ... to pursue an alternative course involving debt
restructuring and a possible change on the exchange rate regime, the
Fund would have supported responsible efforts in this direction."3 7
ment, Coase uses similarly simplified and arbitrarily hypothetical figures to create a situation
that was contrary to the doctrine of the time, in which holding a railroad liable for a fire on
nearby land caused by locomotive sparks is not necessarily the most efficient result. He states,
"Of course, by altering the figures, it could be shown that there are other cases in which it
would be desirable that the railway should be liable for the damage it causes. It is enough for
my purpose to show that, from an economic point of view, a situation in which there is 'un-
compensated damage done to surrounding woods by sparks from railway engines' is not
necessarily undesirable." R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 33-34
(1960). The same could be said here. Although, by altering the figures, box D2 could be made
to score less than box C, the purpose here is to show that the possibility exists that a box D
scenario can be found that is favorable to box C, and that that possibility is real enough to
investigate.
306. Osunsade, supra note 298, at 108 ("It is important to recognize that protection of
the poor in the course of an adjustment program does not necessarily warrant avoidance of
cuts in public expenditures on such goods and services. Adjustment being essentially a policy
effort to align aggregate demand with available resources, the exercise calls legitimately for
assessment of individual expenditure items in terms of alternative uses, within the prevailing
priorities of a polity.").
307. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 6. Mussa later provides an example when this happened,
stating,
It is not infrequent that the Fund-supported programs go off track and fail to meet
their previously agreed-on objectives (spelled out in Fund conditionality). When
this happens, the Fund member is almost always allowed to propose corrective
policies which, if they offer the reasonable expectation of returning performance to
the original program objectives, lead to a Fund decision to continue scheduled
disbursements under the program. This is what happened for Argentina. In view of
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Two things can be gleaned from this exercise: First, both the macro-
economic factors variable and the human rights variable are themselves
composed of multiple variables. Second, there may exist some ideal
combination of human rights concerns and macroeconomic policy con-
cerns, D2, that would lead to better results than macroeconomic
concerns alone, but there also inevitably exists some less ideal combina-
tion, D1, that would actually lead to a worse outcome, as well as any
number of intermediate scenarios like D3. Human rights and macroeco-
nomic concerns cannot jointly and severally be completely satisfied.
Accepting these two realities, the exercise becomes finding the most fa-
vorable combination of variables.
A model which has no perfect solution, but rather seeks as its solu-
tion the best combination of factors based on their relation to other
factors is a common one, and has been widely studied by economists,
political scientists, operations researchers, military strategists, and
mathematicians under the rubric of "game theory.'308 Whereas human
rights law generally is absolute, it cannot be absolute in the structural
adjustment paradigm because the very mechanism (IMF) trying to avoid
human rights violations at T2 by providing available resources may be
causing others at TI (SAPs). Because of this inherent conflict, the struc-
tural adjustment paradigm must be conceptualized differently, and game
theory provides a possibility for such conceptualization. For example,
the concept of the "Nash Equilibrium" provides for balancing situations
which are not zero-sum, and have no "absolute" solution, representing
"the combination of strategies [which is] the best response of each player
to the predicted strategies of the other players. Such a prediction may be
called 'strategically stable' or 'self-enforcing' because no single player is
interested in deviating from the predicted strategy."3°9 The Nash Equilib-
rium is precisely what is sought in box D of the structural adjustment
the new fiscal measures, violation of the fiscal target for the first quarter of 2001
was waived and the disbursement for that quarter (after a short delay) was made.
Id. at 38.
308. William B.T. Mock, Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility, and Economic Sanc-
tions: Corporate Transparency and Human Rights, 8 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 15, 18
(2000) (describing game theory as "a branch of public choice or rational choice analysis...
which ... deals with issues of strategic interaction between parties seeking to maximize their
own interests"). According to Mock, game theory was originally formulated in JOHN VON
NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed.
1953) (1944). Game theory has previously been used in the human rights context to determine
the most effective means of ensuring human rights compliance by transnational corporations.
See Mock, supra, at 18-26 (summarizing game theory and applying the game theoretical con-
cept of separating equilibriums).
309. Moshe Hirsch, Game Theory, International Law, and Future Environmental Coop-
eration in the Middle East, 27 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 75, 80 (1998).
[Vol. 24:577
The Argentine Case Revisited
paradigm: The variables of human rights and macroeconomic concerns
are in competition, but in competition, at least in part, toward the same
goal of highest overall human rights compliance. The best solution, the
Nash Equilibrium, is the one which leads to the best combined score. In
the example in Table II above, the Nash Equilibrium is box D2.
The goal of this discussion is not a complete examination of game
thdory. Rather, it has been to show that the structural adjustment para-
digm assumes that macroeconomics and human rights work toward the
same goal, overall human rights compliance. A solution closer to this
goal is reached when both creditor confidence and human rights are con-
sidered as variables in the overall solution. In that scenario, the optimum
amount for each is that which best increases the whole, not necessarily
the maximum possible value. Through game theory, this sort of solution
is commonly sought across many disciplines.3 '
D. Using International Human Rights Law to Address
the Structural Adjustment Paradigm
1. Where Would the Ideal Monitoring Body Be?
Once one accepts that some level of human rights monitoring of
structural adjustment is legitimate and indeed desirable, the next ques-
tion is the form that such monitoring should take. This Section will
attempt to address this issue, beginning with a discussion of the most
appropriate locus of the monitoring body, and concluding with a discus-
sion of the most appropriate structure of that body.
In terms of human rights monitoring of the IMF, the first question to
be asked is whether such monitoring should be within the institution it-
self or part of some exterior structure. From within, the most salient
example is certainly the World Bank's recently established Inspection
Panel, created in 1993 to hear complaints from civil society and bring
them to World Bank management. 3"' Although this is a step in the right
310. Hirsch, supra note 309, at 78 ("Mathematicians were the first to develop game
theory, primarily for use in economics. Later, other disciplines, such as political science, inter-
national relations, law, sociology and biology also employed game theory concepts... ").
311. For an exhaustive description of the Inspection Panel, see IBRAHIM Fl. SHIHATA,
THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE (2d ed. 2000); see also SKOGLY, supra
note 7, at 180-85 (noting that the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Develop-
ment Bank, and the Asian Development Bank have all created similar inspection panels, but
the IMF has not); Daniel C. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints:
The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 553 (1994) (providing a
general overview of the operation of the Inspection Panel); see also SKOGLY, supra note 7, at
22 ("The initiatives to address ... problems have been more substantial on the part of the
World Bank than has been the case for the IMF. The IMF has tended to reject its role in ad-
dressing these issues, seeing them as distributional policy problems on which the fund cannot
take a position, and has left it to the national governments to address.").
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direction in terms of transparency, Skogly finds it insufficient on two
levels.3 2 First, it does not accept complaints from individuals.33 This is a
major shortfall indeed, as individual complaint mechanisms are now
widely seen as the future of human rights monitoring, the most effective
means of developing human rights law. ' 4 Second, the complaints may
only regard acts or omissions of the Bank's operational policies and pro-
cedures, not human rights law generally.35 Even Skogly does not seem to
take this idea far enough: Whereas she notes that the Panel can and has
treated human rights not explicitly covered in the policies, there is no
guarantee the Panel can and will systematically take this step.36 Al-
though upholding Bank policies and procedures may sometimes uphold
human rights, it cannot be assumed that all human rights are upheld by
the policies and procedures. A system is therefore still lacking in which
all human rights law is applied to the Bank.3'
312. Paul, supra note 33, at 317 (arguing that in creating the Inspection Panel, the World
Bank "appears to recognize both the general principle that [International Development Agen-
cies] must be accountable for legally cognizable wrongs (i.e., rights violations) resulting from
their activities, and an obligation to provide structures for mediation and redress for claims of
wrongdoing").
313. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 18 1.
314. Markus G. Schmidt, Individual Human Rights Complaints Procedures Based on
United Nations Treaties and the Need for Reform, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 645 (1992) ("The
right of individuals to complain about alleged violations of their human rights to expert bodies
established under United Nations human rights instruments is one of the major achievements
of UN efforts aimed at the protection and promotion of human rights."); see also Alfred de
Zayas, The Examination of Individual Complaints by the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mittee Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MECHANISMS 67 (Gudmunder Al-
fredsson et al. eds., 2001) (providing detailed analysis of the working methods and
jurisprudence of the individual complaints mechanism under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, arguing that the individual complaints mechanism has made a posi-
tive contribution to human rights protection).
315. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 18 1.
316. Id. at 182-84 (noting the first complaint to the Inspection Panel, the Arun III Hy-
droelectric Project in Nepal, was framed entirely in environmental terms instead of human
rights terms because of the Bank's more active policies in environmental issues).
317. Skogly also makes the point that the Inspection Panel is weak in that it is not a
judicial body. Id. But this is the common status of human rights mechanisms, especially at the
global level. Of all the problems of the Inspection Panel, this is not the biggest. The same
could be said for Skogly's concern that the Panel is weak since the Board of Directors can
simply override it (noting Board denial of an inspection proposed by the Inspection Panel in
the Itpartica Resettlement and Irrigation Project in Brazil). Id at 184-85; see also Dana L.
Clark, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: The World Bank and Human Rights: The
Need for Greater Accountability, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 205 (2002) (providing examples of
"glaring gaps" between problems identified by the Inspection Panel and institutional commit-
ment and capacity to remedy them, and proposing the creation of a "Development
Effectiveness Remedial Team to address the ongoing suffering caused by unsustainable devel-
opment-induced displacement and to provide oversight and effective remedial assistance to
local communities where the Inspection Panel has identified violations of Bank policies result-
ing in harm"). While I agree with both authors that a Panel that lacks "teeth" is not ideal, it is
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In addition to Skogly's concerns about the Inspection Panel system,
two more are apparent: First, the panel lacks institutional expertise in
human rights jurisprudence. Human rights law, evolving for over fifty
years, is complex, so much so that each human rights treaty has a corre-
sponding treaty body to interpret it, and attempts to combine the treaty
bodies have continuously been rejected.38 One panel composed of hu-
man rights "outsiders" could not possibly possess sufficient knowledge
of the field to adequately judge projects from a human rights perspective.
Even if the panel could draw on human rights law, it may not know how
to use it. A body that can truly interpret and apply human rights norms
not only needs to be able to draw on those norms, it needs to be a human
rights, body. Any other panel, especially an internal one, is more likely to
draw on economic theory than human rights law, and to risk applying the
human rights norms incorrectly when it does try to apply them. Also, the
Inspection Panel is too close to the institution it is monitoring to be in-
dependent. 3'9 As an interior body of the Bank itself, its ideas cannot be
completely independent of the ideology of that institution.30 This con-
cern was raised by several NGOs in the planning stages of the Inspection
nevertheless quite standard for human rights mechanisms to lack relative powers compared to
the international actors they control. It would be unrealistic to suggest a binding mechanism
with complete control over the Bank from a human rights approach. More importantly, for
reasons outlined in this Note, it would also be unwise: The structural adjugtment paradigm
requires the input of both human rights and macroeconomic voices.
318. Hurst Hannum, Book Review, Setting a New Agenda for UN Human Rights Activi-
ties, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 823, 826 (1994) (reviewing THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (Philip Alston ed., 1992)) ("[T]he mandates and powers of the
various procedures remain sufficiently different-and human rights violations sufficiently
widespread-that it is premature to call for combining procedures under the rubric of greater
efficiency").
319. Skogly also expresses an "independence" concern, but it is not the same kind of
independence I am focusing on. Rather, she couches her concern about the lack of power of
the Inspection Panel to bind the Board of Directors in terms of "independence" of the Panel
from the Board. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 184-85. I am referring to independence of the ideas
of the Panel from the ideology of the Bank. Whereas I play down Skogly's "lack of power"
independence, she is similarly less concerned about my "autonomy" independence, arguing
that it is "secured through the provisions concerning the members of the panel and their prior
and post-appointment independence from the Bank." Id. at 184.
320. THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: THE FIRST FOUR YEARS (1994-1998), at
323 (Alsvar Umana-Quesada ed., 1998) (noting that the Inspection Panel has been under ex-
treme pressure in its operations). The World Bank denies this claim, arguing that a number of
safeguards insure the independence of the Inspection Panel, including the mandatory two year
lapse before Bank employees can become Panel members, the fact that Panel member terms
are non-renewable, and the independent budget of the Panel. It further points to participation
by NGOs, and evidence of strong disagreement between the Panel and Bank management as
proof that the Panel is independent. SHIHATA, supra note 311, at 206-07. If the Inspection
Panel is truly as independent as the Bank claims, it is unclear why the Bank did not go the one
additional step and allow for a Panel physically removed from the Bank. Similarly, if NGOs
truly have a voice, it is unclear why efforts to formalize this voice were rejected. Id. at 21.
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Panel. Their proposal of an "Independent Appeals Commission," with
significantly more autonomy than the Inspection Panel, was eventually
disregarded.2
Both of the concerns expressed above, as well as both of Skogly's,
could be solved by an inspecting body that was part of the international
human rights framework instead of the IFI's framework. Like other
mechanisms in the international human rights framework, it would draw
on human rights treaties and be made up of experts in the field of human1 - 22
rights. It could have an individual complaints mechanism. It would be
sufficiently distanced from the IFIs to be considered independent and
impartial. The only question that remains is whether there is an existing
mechanism that could take on this role, or whether a new mechanism
must be created.
Skogly believes that, although none of the existing human rights
mechanisms are currently suited for monitoring IFI compliance with
human rights norms, the most likely formulation would be a working
group under the Commission on Human Rights which would deal with
complaints in a manner inspired by the current 1503 procedure. 23 In
terms of convention-based organs, Skogly believes that new conventions
or at least protocols would have to be created to oversee IFI compliance
with human rights norms, noting that none of the conventions give direct
obligations to the IFIs, since IFIs cannot accede to them.24 Although she
is certainly correct that a working group is most feasible, the most com-
plete solution would involve both the U.N. Charter-based and treaty-
based human rights mechanisms, which have been shown to exist in a
synergistic relationship: The treaty bodies provide a review that is both
more individual and more judicial; the Charter-based mechanisms pro-
vide a forum that is more political, more general, and less constrained by
individual treaty obligations. 5
321. SHIHATA, supra note 311, at 20-21.
322. See, for example, the Human Rights Committee, which works with the Interna-
tional Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and is "composed of nationals of the States
Parties to the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] ... who shall be persons
of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights." See Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 28, 40, Dec. 19, 1966 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
323. SKOGLY, supra note 7, at 187 (acknowledging that U.N. Charter-based organs are
limited since only consistent patterns of gross violations of human rights are examined,
leaving no room for individual cases).
324. Id. at 188.
325. On complementarity between Charter- and treaty-based mechanisms, see Sir Nigel
Rodley, United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures of the
Commission on Human Rights-Complementarity or Competition?, 25 HUM. RTS. Q.
(forthcoming Aug. 2003) (arguing that the two systems are substantially different, and
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2. How Would the Ideal Monitoring Body Function?
Even once the above concerns are addressed in terms of where the
monitoring mechanism will be, the question remains how it will be
structured. Because the structural adjustment paradigm is unique in that
the IMF, in attempting to assist a State in meeting its ICESCR
obligations, violates human rights, it calls for a unique structure, which
adequately reflects the rights and duties of all actors. 6 The appropriate
example should be taken from the ILO model of tripartism, in which the
composition of all main political bodies, but even some quasi-judicial
structures, must reflect the presence of employers, workers, and the
government of each Member State.3 27 This structure has added vigor and
dynamism to the ILO's work, and increased the authority of its
therefore complementary, from the standpoint of structural features, style of communication,
focus, working methods, fact-finding capacity, and general activities).
326. See STIGLITZ, supra note 177, at 225 (expressing concern that only finance minis-
ters and central bank governors have been involved in IMF decisions so the decisions have
reflected only the views of those stakeholders).
327. Constitution of the ILO (Oct. 9, 1946), arts. 3, 7, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, 46-54; see also
Nicolas Valticos & Geraldo W. von Potobsky, International Labour Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ELL Supp. 163, 1 36-37
(R. Blainpain ed., 1994) (citing C. Wilfred Jenks, The Significance for International Law of
the Tripartite Character of the International Labour Organisation, 22 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
GROTIUS SOCIETY 45 (1936), and others). Although tripartism involves representation from all
three groups, they are not necessarily represented equally. Usually, there are two government
delegates for every one delegate from labor and employers. See ELIANE VOGEL-POLSKY, Du
TRIPARTISME A L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE Du TRAVAIL 23-29 (1966) (describing a
representation of delegates weighted toward government in the Conference and Administrative
Council of the ILO, but equal representation in the ILO Industrial Commissions). This Note
has argued above that the most effective monitoring system would combine both Charter- and
treaty-based mechanisms. On this issue, too, the ILO example can be followed, which applies
the tripartite structure both in the judicial and political organs. See Jenks, supra, at 46-48
(explaining the tripartite structure of the Conference and Governing Body, political bodies);
id. at 64 (explaining that in interpretation of ILO Conventions (a judicial function), "a definite
procedure is prescribed for the consideration by tripartite organs"); see also Valticos & von
Potobsky, supra, 6 82 (explaining the quasi-judicial interpretation of "representations" by the
Governing Body, a tripartite organ). Moreover, just as the structural adjustment paradigm is a
nontraditional hybrid of individidual, national, and international competing interests, so did
Jenks remark in 1936 that ILO tripartism created a unique treaty interpretation paradigm: "In
connection with interpretation there arises the further question of whether the tripartite
character of the Organisation implies any modification of the principles of interprtation
applicable to international instruments. In some cases it would appear to do so. Thus the
object of any recourse to the preparatory work of international labour Conventions must be to
discover not the intention of the parties but the intention of the International Labour
Conference." Jenks, supra, %1 37. Thus, in the ILO, like in the structural adjustment paradigm,
it is the combination of interests that counts. But see Hannum, supra note 318, at 826 (arguing
that "the formal role given to NGOs under the ILO's tripartite structure cannot be duplicated
within the United Nations," but conceding that "the ILO experience does illustrate the impor-
tance of substantially improving NGO access to the various U.N. bodies").
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decisions."' Just as the framers of the ILO deemed the voice of labor and
commercial interests so important as to necessarily add to the voice of
governments, so too must multiple voices be heard in the structural
adjustment paradigm. 9 The first set of representatives would be U.N.
experts, speaking independently from their governments and appointed
in a manner consistent with other human rights treaty bodies. Like in
other treaty bodies, these experts would base their reasoning and their
arguments primarily in the normative framework of human rights law
itself, as compared to the more political Commission on Human
Rights.33° They would be unconstrained by political and economic
concerns. The second group of representatives would be the experts
appointed from the IFIs, very much like those who sit on the World Bank
Inspection Panel. These members would take both human rights and
macroeconomic concerns into account, but in order to provide the best
balance of interests in the overall committee, they would be economists
before being human rights commentators. Finally, the third group would
be composed of government representatives, so as to take into account
328. Valticos & von Potobsky, supra note 327, at 35. Valticos and von Potobsky point
out:
The Organization's tripartite structure has been an undeniable source of vigour for
the ILO, as it gave it the support not only of the diplomatic representatives of
States, but also of the productive forces of nations. The participation of workers
brought an element of dynamism ... In spite of the delay that divergent interests
sometimes involved, the tripartite structure of the ILO gave an increased authority
to its decisions, as these were taken with due consideration of the positions of all
parties concerned.
Id. (citing Resolution Concerning the Strengthening of Tripartism in the Over-All Activities of
the ILO, Rec. Proc. Conf. 56, at 806-08 (1971), and Resolution Concerning the Strengthening
of Tripartism in ILO Supervisory Procedures of International Sabour Standards and Technical
Co-operation Programmes, Rec. Proc. Conf. 63, at 847-49 (1977)).
329. VOGEL-POLSKY, supra note 327, at 321 ("En instituant le syst~me tripartite A
l'O.I.T. les promoteurs de la Ldgislation Sociale Internationale ont voulu tenir compte des
intdrets des trois groupes sociaux en pr6sence (les travailleurs, les employeurs et les gouver-
nements) et en faire la synthise. Or ces int6rts sont fr6quemment diff6rents, si pas oppos6s
[In instituting the tripartite system in the ILO, the promoters of the International Social Legi-
slation wanted to take the interests of the three social groups present into account (the
workers, the employers, and the governments), synthesizing these interests. But, these inte-
rests are frequently different, if not opposed]."). The ESCR Committee agrees: "Many
activities undertaken in the name of "development" have subsequently been recognized as ill-
conceived and even counter-productive in human rights terms. In order to reduce the incidence
of such problems, the whole range of issues dealt with in the Covenant should, wherever pos-
sible and appropriate, be given specific and careful consideration." General Comment No. 2,
supra note 53, 7. The "Independent Appeals Commission," described above, also attempted
to counter-balance "official" voices, in this case by providing two NGO representatives on the
nine member proposed Commission. SHIHATA, supra note 311, at 21.
330. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CON-
TEXT 601-02 (2000).
[Vol. 24:577
The Argentine Case Revisited
political concerns, acting as spokespersons for their citizens. In order for
this group to be effective, it would be composed half of members who
represent borrowing States and half of members who represent lending
States. Alternatively, the third group could be composed of NGO
representatives, keeping in stride with the notion in development
literature that NGO representatives are better suited to represent poor
and disadvantaged groups than are their governments. 3
A common problem encountered when one starts mixing economic
theory and human rights is that the fields are based on such different
models that common ground is hard to come by. As a result, human
rights commentators and economists very often end up talking past each
other.332 The tripartite structure would avoid this phenomenon by putting
the human rights commentators and the economists in the same room
and forcing them to agree on a solution,333 The reason why this is possi-
ble is based on the fact that, in the structural adjustment paradigm, it is
accepted that the solution is not going to be a perfect one. Rather, the
Committee would be looking for the Nash Equilibrium. In order to find
such a solution where economic, human rights, and political concerns
331. Paula Rhodes & Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds, Expanding NGO Participation in Inter-
national Decision Making, in WORLD DEBT AND THE HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 1, at
153, 153-57 (challenging the classic thesis that the State is the best and most logical represen-
tative on the international scene of poor and disadvantaged members of a society);
Williamson, supra note 2, at 10-11 (arguing that even if government legitimately attempted to
gain the opinions of different societal groups, this task may be overburdensome, and suggest-
ing direct contact between IFIs and such groups).
332. On the ongoing controversy about the wisdom of embedding human rights in inter-
national trade treaties (linkages), see Pradeep S. Mehta, Human Rights and International
Trade: Right Cause With Wrong Intentions, 2001 CUTS CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EcONOMICS & ENVIRONMENT (Briefing Paper No. 3/2001, Jaipur Printers, Mar. 2001) (argu-
ing against linkages); see also Caroline Dommen, Raising Human Rights Concerns in the
World Trade Organization: Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies, 24 HUM. RTS Q. 1
(2002) (supporting the use of linkages, but nevertheless noting specific areas of conflict be-
tween human rights norms and WTO-related policies); Symposium, The Boundaries of the
WTO: The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 146, 157 (summarizing many diver-
gent expert opinions on linkages from a related symposium, but noting that "[r]epresentatives
to the WTO from the 'global South' have long opposed the formal or legal linking of trade and
labor issues"); Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade Linkage and Human Rights, in THE URUGUAY ROUND
AND BEYOND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR DUNKEL 241, 249 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias
Hirsch eds., 1998) (arguing that linkages are "not an efficient way to advance a human rights
or social issues agenda"); Paul, supra note 33, at 3 10 (arguing that the international law codi-
fying the right to development "exists in an uneasy relationship with the International
Economic Law (IEL), which deals with trade, investment, intellectual property and access to
technologies, and the activities of Transnational Corporations (TNCs)").
333. See, e.g., Osunsade, supra note 298, at 111-12 ("Through combined efforts on the
part of various organizations, in collaboration with a wide range of institutions in adjustment
problem countries, it is possible to produce synergetic effects in identifying and addressing
issues relating to possible adverse human conditions impacts of adjustment programs ...
Efforts by third-party entities such as NGOs, academics, UNICEF, and other United Nations
agencies not directly involved in adjustment lending have undoubtedly been important .... ).
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are all considered equally and thus the best balance possible is struck
between them, we must put all the stakeholders in the same room and let
them bargain.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has explored the relationship between IMF structural
adjustment programs (SAPs) and economic, social and cultural rights
obligations (ESC rights). Beginning with a short examination of SAPs in
macroeconomic terms, the majority of the Note focuses on a human
rights analysis of SAPs, in the particular context of the current Argentine
crisis. Following a brief summary of the legal status of human rights
norms in the Argentine context, it then examines three areas where SAPs
have conflicted with ESC rights in Argentina: the zero-deficit plan, cuts
to social security, and provincial cuts. It then addresses the more
controversial area of monetary policy, arguing that even though
monetary policy decisions are ostensibly sovereign decisions and they do
not appear directly in Argentina's Letter of Intent to the IMF, the IMF
has nevertheless played a role in these decisions. Having established
certain areas where SAPs' austerity measures are inconsistent with ESC
rights, it argues that this occurs because the IMF is often forced to
demand these measures because it is beholden to the confidence of
private creditors. In cases where this tension between creditor confidence
and ESC rights is present, this Note argues that a unique human rights
paradigm is created, whereby the IMF is simultaneously helping a State
to meet its ICESCR obligations by providing "available resources," and
preventing the State from meeting its Covenant obligations by imposing
SAPs. The final Part of this Note searches for a human rights solution to
this paradigm. The Note argues that because its solution will often be
imperfect, it resembles a Nash Equilibrium in game theory, and that the
ideal mechanism to reach this solution would involve economists, human
rights experts, and country representatives in a body modeled on ILO
tripartism. The tripartite system could be a tool to transcend the ever-
present divide between concerns for ESC rights and concerns for
macroeconomic stability. With such a tripartite decision structure, the
international community would no longer be bounded by respective
disciplines and academic limitations in dealing with questions that
concern all human rights advocates, all economists, indeed everyone on
Earth ....
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